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ABSTRACT—This Article investigates the relationship between the
exclusive rights of patents, their information disclosures, and the impact they
have on the development of future technologies. An examination of over
1000 patents that courts have held valid or invalid reveals a significant
positive relationship. Specifically, the private rights and technological
impact of patents rise and fall together, and moreover, both are related to the
quantity of new and useful technical information contained in their
disclosures.
This Article identifies, for the first time, significant differences between
the technological impact of valid patents and invalid patents, as measured by
the future patented inventions that relate to the original patent. Additionally,
significant differences are also observed based on the reason for a patent’s
invalidity, with failure to disclose novel technical information corresponding
to the weakest future impact. These differences are traced back to
quantifiable variations in the information content of valid patents relative to
patents invalidated for lack of novelty, obviousness, or indefiniteness.
Finally, the analysis completes the circuit by linking the breadth of a patent’s
exclusive claims, when validly supported by its disclosure, to the impact that
patent has on future technological progress. Taken together, this study finds
that the greater the information content of a patent’s disclosure, the higher
the probability it will be held valid, and in turn, the larger its expected
positive impact on the development of future technologies.
This study contributes to patent and cumulative innovation scholarship
by investigating how the information disclosure of patents relates both to the
private value of their exclusive rights and to the technological progress they
promote. Furthermore, this study uncovers significant differences between
valid and invalid patents. Moreover, unique metrics are offered for directly
† For data visualization tools that allow for additional exploration of the data used in the Article, visit
the following link: https://nulr.shinyapps.io/patents. For interactive appendix material for this Article,
visit the following link: https://nuitrcs.github.io/ashtor_patents_appendix. Materials are permanently
archived at https://doi.org/10.21985/N2KJ22.
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analyzing the information content of any patent, providing tools for future
research.
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INTRODUCTION
Patents have a constitutional mandate to promote technological
progress,1 but there is unresolved debate over whether and how they achieve
this purpose.2 According to foundational patent theory, patents represent a
“tradeoff” between the benefits to society of public disclosure of new
technical information in a patent’s specification versus the burdens of private
exclusivity over that which is disclosed.3 This study aims to test this
relationship empirically and determine whether patent rights over technical
information benefit or impede future technological progress.
This study finds that valid patents actively promote follow-on
innovation during their terms of exclusivity. By analyzing over 1500 patents
whose validity has been determined by U.S. courts, valid patents are
observed to give rise to more future related inventions during their lifetimes
than invalid patents. Moreover, this effect is directly related to the extent of
technical information disclosed in and claimed by the patents. Patents with a
greater quantity of information content are more likely to secure valid
exclusive rights to their owners. In turn, these patents contribute to the
development of more future inventions by other inventors. By contrast,
invalid patents tend to have weaker information disclosures and give rise to
fewer future inventions. Finally, contrary to “tradeoff” theory, the breadth of
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
2 See generally Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2016)
(discussing how not only content, but also context, is necessary in patent disclosure to achieve
technological progress); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (discussing
the importance of patent disclosure and arguing why it is underperforming); François Lévêque & Yann
Ménière, Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes? (Dec. 2006) (working paper with CERNA, Centre
d’économie
industrielle
Ecole
Nationale
Supérieure
des
Mines
de
Paris),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=958830 [https://perma.cc/VZ6N-5J6U] (discussing whether and how patents
impact and stimulate innovation).
3 See, e.g., David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 96,
96–98 (2010) (discussing tradeoff theory); see also Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in LongTerm Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045–46 (2015).
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a valid patent’s claims—that is, the scope of exclusivity accorded the patent
holder—is found to be positively correlated with the development of future
technologies.
To conduct this analysis, data is collected on a large set of patents that
have either been invalidated by U.S. federal district courts for failure to
disclose novel,4 nonobvious,5 or sufficiently defined6 technical information
or that have survived scrutiny under these criteria. The technological impact
of each of these patents, as measured by the number of future patented
inventions that reference them (also known as “forward citations”) over their
lifetimes,7 is evaluated while controlling for other relevant factors such as
patent age, technology class, and intrinsic characteristics. Forward citations
are a widely recognized measure of cumulative innovation for patented
inventions, as they provide a quantitative value that represents the number
of future inventions that were derived from, or otherwise are technologically
related to, the cited patent.8
This analysis finds a strong positive relationship between validity and
forward citations. Extensive statistical tests are conducted to control for
potential sources of bias, such as selection effects, variations among patents,
and potential endogenous interaction between case outcomes and citations.
Furthermore, for independent verification, these results are reproduced with
a nonoverlapping dataset of different patents held valid or invalid by the
Federal Circuit over a different time period.
Next, this relationship between patent validity and forward citations is
investigated by analyzing the information content of each of the patents in
the dataset. Both validity and technological impact (forward citations) are
found to be positively related to information content. Using the statutory
criteria for patent validity as a proxy for information content, as further
4

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty requirement).
Id. § 103 (nonobviousness requirement).
6 Id. § 112 (definiteness requirement).
7 Lifetime forward citations are used herein to observe the impact of certain patents on cumulative
innovation from issuance. This differs from studies that measure citations in a specified time period to
observe the impact of certain events during a patent’s life on subsequent cumulative innovation relating
to that patent. See, e.g., infra Section I.D.
8 See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence
from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317, 329 (2015); Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators:
A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1668–90 (1990) (surveying forward citations and other
quantitative patent metrics); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 16, 16–17 (2005); David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or
Strategic Disruption? 1–4 (Penn Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13-065, 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2351809 [https://perma.cc/CYF9-MJW4]; Ufuk Akcigit et al., The Mechanics
of Endogenous Innovation and Growth: Evidence from Historical U.S. Patents 2–5 (Nov. 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://siepr.stanford.edu/system/files/kerr.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UKAKTZK].
5
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explained below,9 patents lacking novelty are found to have the weakest
impact on future technologies. Next, unique metrics are constructed to
analyze patent information content directly, introducing several new
variables to capture the age, scope, and quality of the patent’s disclosure.
This reveals that the technological impact of a patent rises and falls with the
information content of its disclosure.
Finally, to connect the dots between patent exclusivity, information
disclosure, and cumulative innovation, the relationship between the breadth
of a valid patent’s claims (i.e., the strength of its exclusivity rights) and the
impact it has on future technological development is analyzed. This reveals
that valid patents with broader claims give rise to more future inventions than
those with narrower claims.
Taken together, these results indicate that patent validity, breadth of
exclusivity, and future technological impact all move together. Information
disclosure lies at the heart of each of these phenomena.10
These results speak directly to the central tenet of the “tradeoff” theory
of patents. When the disclosure function of patents is working properly,
patents tend to promote future technological progress notwithstanding their
exclusive rights. The discussion below draws upon modern economic growth
literature to identify the processes by which patents promote technological
progress, and it shows how the disclosure function of patents aligns the
private value of exclusivity with the public benefits of future progress.11
This paper is organized as follows. Part I addresses patent tradeoff
theory and reviews previous empirical studies of the effects of patents on
cumulative innovation. Part II details experimental design and methodology.
Part III presents first-order results, robustness checks, and independent
verification procedure. Finally, Part IV dives deeper into the data to
investigate the relationship between information content and technological
impact. This Article concludes by discussing the implications of the findings
and posing questions for future research.
I.

PATENT DISCLOSURE THEORY AND RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES

This Part discusses relevant theory and prior empirical studies that
guide the analysis herein. First, foundational patent “tradeoff” theory is
discussed in order to understand the tension between patent disclosure and
9

See infra Section IV.A.
This study does not perform a causal analysis, and therefore, it does not make conclusive
statements as to possible causality in the relationships observed. For example, this study is not claiming
that additional information disclosure causes a patent to receive more forward citations; rather, it simply
relates the extent of information disclosure with the number of future citations received.
11 See infra Section I.C.
10
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exclusivity, which sets the stage for evaluating the downstream impact on
cumulative innovation. Against this backdrop, New Growth Theory provides
an alternative framework that reconciles patent exclusivity with future
technological progress. Theories of patent disclosure and applicant
incentives are also discussed.
Next, empirical scholarship of cumulative innovation, using measures
based on both patents and non-patented scientific publications, are surveyed.
These studies investigate the foregrounded theoretical principles, in
particular focusing on whether patents impede future scientific research in a
variety of fields.
Finally, scholarship focusing on the relationship between patent
validity and patented cumulative innovation is addressed. Although previous
work has evaluated whether the event of a patent’s invalidation has an effect
on subsequent innovation in the relevant market, no prior study has
investigated how and why the lifetime cumulative innovation based on a
patent varies based on the validity or invalidity of that patent, which is the
focus of the present inquiry.
A. “Tradeoff” Theory of Patent Disclosure
Patent “tradeoff” theory was formalized in the late 1960s as an
economic model for integrating the process of technological invention into
conventional economic analysis.12 The older neoclassical tradition had
viewed technological change as an exogenous or external shock to the
economy. Like an unanticipated stroke of genius, invention was thought to
occur serendipitously by way of brilliant inventors who were oblivious to
economic incentives.13 In his famous 1969 article An Economic Theory of
Technological Change,14 Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus intervenes in
economics growth literature and explains the functioning of patents in the
process of technological development. Professor Nordhaus takes as a starting
point the notion that invention is an economically rational process
undertaken by actors—individual inventors and companies—who respond to
incentives provided by the broader economy.15 As such, people will invest
12 See William D. Nordhaus, An Economic Theory of Technological Change, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 18,
18–19 (1969).
13 The “Schumpeter tradition” in economics of technological change treats invention as a disruptive
process by which new technologies and processes overturn old ones. See id. at 18.
14 Id.
15 Nordhaus cites to Schumpeter, Arrow, Schmookler, and others who had introduced the idea “of
invention as an exogenous force acting on the economic system,” rather than an endogenous activity
arising from within the system itself. Id. For further discussion on the “exogenous force” perspective of
the cited pieces, see generally JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1966);
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942), and Kenneth J. Arrow,
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resources in researching and developing new inventions if and to the extent
that their expected returns justify the investment.16 Professor Nordhaus’s key
contribution is the idea that patent laws are the mechanism by which society
offers these returns, in the form of “temporary little monopolies on
information.”17
Professor Nordhaus argues that some form of monopoly over technical
information is required to provide sufficient incentives to invest in R&D.18
This argument draws upon an ancient principle of intellectual property
theory. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, ideas are “like fire, expansible over all
space, without lessening their density in any point.”19 In economic lingo,
information and ideas are “public goods,”20 which, unlike tangible goods that
have a finite number of physical embodiments, are “non-rival”—they are
transmittable and reproducible at zero marginal cost.21 And in the absence of
intellectual property protection, they are “non-excludable,” because it is
impossible to prevent others from using an idea once it has been disclosed.22
Yet Professor Nordhaus recognizes that patents do not provide
permanent or very powerful exclusive rights over information. Patents only
confer “temporary little monopolies,”23 meaning that the information therein
may be accessed by other inventors. During the patent term, the invention
may be licensed or acquired from the patent owner at negotiated rates.24 After
the patent expires, the technical disclosure is freely available for use by other
inventors.25 Thus, by either process, inventions can function as inputs into
the development of future inventions.
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609–25 (1962).
16 Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 18 (“[O]ver half patented inventions are assigned to profit-oriented
corporations . . . .”); id. at 19 (“[I]nventors get profits from inventions . . . .”).
17 Id. at 19.
18 Id. (“It should be stressed that the monopoly over information is essential for a sensible treatment
of invention when invention is a public good.”).
19 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Albert Ellery Berg ed., 1907).
20 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 97–99 (discussing public goods).
21 Id. at 98–99.
22 See id.; Arrow, supra note 15, at 615; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual
Property Law and the Boundaries of the Firm (Harv. Law Sch., John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ., and
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 480, 2004; Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for Law and Econ., Research Paper
No. 04-19, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195 [https://perma.cc/3RRB-TG2P] (discussing Arrow’s
disclosure paradox).
23 Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 19 (“In sum, the model used here is a traditional neoclassical model
except for the introduction of a multitude of temporary little monopolies on information.”).
24 See id.
25 Id. (“In the model we assume that the inventor has exclusive rights to use and/or license the
invention for T years, after which the invention enters the public domain as public knowledge.”).
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Professor Nordhaus thereby completes the circuit of invention as an
endogenous factor in economic growth. Inventors are economic actors who
have incentives to develop new inventions, and they have, albeit limited and
sometimes delayed, access to existing inventions from which to create new
ones. This gives rise to the famous “patent tradeoff.”26 According to
Professor Nordhaus, the incentives of patent owners are in tension with the
public interest in having access to and using new inventions. These
competing forces must therefore be balanced, principally by calibrating the
length of the patent term, to achieve socially optimal incentives to engage in
R&D activity.27
B. New Growth Theory of Patent Disclosure
Professor Nordhaus’s tradeoff theory describes a tug-of-war between
private and public interests concerning patents. However, economists have
since refined their theoretical models for technological innovation and
growth. In the early 1990s, Professor Paul Romer revolutionized economic
growth theory with a new model of endogenous technological change.28 A
key feature of Professor Romer’s “New Growth Theory” is that technical
information functions as both exclusive private property and usable public
knowledge simultaneously.29
Professor Romer argues that patented information is “nonrival” in both
its direct use (practicing the invention described in a patent) and in its indirect
productive use (inspiring future inventions).30 However, only the direct use
is exclusively restricted by patent rights. Crucially, by contrast, patented
information remains publicly available for productive use during the patent
term.31 Thus, the knowledge stock of the economy is only “partially
excludable” by patents. And contrary to “tradeoff” theory, patents facilitate

26

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990) (“In most analyses of the different aspects of the patent system,
concern has centered on a simple tradeoff.”).
27 Id. (“Nordhaus’s analysis of optimum patent life is concerned with the tradeoff between increased
inventive effort resulting from longer anticipated patent life and greater deadweight costs associated with
longer monopoly.”); see also F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 422–27 (1972) (interpreting Nordhaus’s economic formulas
geometrically); William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 428,
428–31 (1972) (responding to Scherer’s geometric interpretation).
28 Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990).
29 Id. (“The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional
good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good.”).
30 Id. at S75 (“[T]reating knowledge as a nonrival good makes it possible to talk sensibly about
knowledge spillovers, that is, incomplete excludability.”).
31 Id. at S79 (“The model used here separates the rival component of knowledge, H, from the
nonrival, technological component, A.”).
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the public disclosure of new technical information that is immediately
available as an input for subsequent innovation.32
But the benefits of patent disclosure are not guaranteed. Writing around
the same time as Professor Romer, Professor Suzanne Scotchmer theorized
the incentives and coordination structures of patent owners and their
competitors with respect to information disclosure.33 Professor Scotchmer
reasoned that inventors may be discouraged from disclosing their inventions
in a patent application when competitors can use that information to develop
successor technologies.34 By contrast, when the scope of exclusivity is too
broad relative to the information disclosed in a patent, it may extend to
follow-on inventions and discourage subsequent research.35 The risk is
particularly high in the context of cumulative research and innovation, where
new technologies are dependent on previous advances.36
Thus, the justification for patents centers on the relationship between
disclosure and exclusivity. As Professor Jeanne Fromer writes, “patent
disclosure indirectly stimulates future innovation by revealing the
invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the patent term
expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention,
even during the patent term.”37 However, there is a corollary risk that
ineffective disclosure, whether by virtue of strategic withholding by patent

32

Id. at S85 (“In an overall sense . . . nonrival design inputs are partially excludable.”).
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991); see also Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure
in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131 (1990) (analyzing how applicants have incentives to limit
disclosure in patents and the implications on patenting and innovation).
34 Scotchmer, supra note 33, at 39 (“Patent law requires disclosure for the same reason that
innovators dislike it: it is the vehicle by which technical knowledge is passed from the patenting firm to
its competitors.”).
35 Id. at 30 (“If broad protection is granted, then a derivative or second generation product will likely
infringe the prior patent, so a license on the original patent is required to market it.”); id. at 38 (“Before
investing in a second generation technology, the researcher must evaluate the probability that the new
technology will not infringe the prior patent. This probability depends on the breadth of the prior patent
and on the distribution of possible outcomes of the second investment.”).
36 Id. at 29 (“Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current
evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by
earlier innovators.”); see also James E. Bessen, From Knowledge to Ideas: The Two Faces of Innovation
29
(Boston
Univ.
Sch.
of
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
10-35,
2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698802 [https://perma.cc/NQB9-KAAT] (“[T]o
the extent that firms practicing the old technology have patents that read on the new technology, patents
can serve to block entry to some degree.”). See generally Akcigit et al., supra note 8 (discussing
cumulative innovation and patents).
37 Fromer, supra note 2, at 541 (emphasis added).
33

951

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

applicants or overly broad rights upon patent issuance, may grant too much
power to the patent holder and impede future development.38
The foregoing theoretical principles have been investigated and tested
in a number of sophisticated empirical studies, which serve as precedents for
the present inquiry. In particular, the following Section addresses empirical
studies of cumulative innovation, studies focusing on patent invalidation and
the impact that has on cumulative innovation in the relevant technology
markets, and lessons to be learned from this scholarship that will guide the
analysis below.
C. Empirical Studies of Cumulative Innovation
Several empirical studies have analyzed whether the private exclusivity
conferred by patents, in practice if not in principle, impedes subsequent
utilization of the information disclosed thereby. Their methodologies and
findings guide the present inquiry by providing an empirical framework for
analyzing cumulative innovation as it relates to patent rights.
One of the earliest empirical studies in this vein seeks to measure the
“anti-commons effect”39 of a patent grant over published scientific
knowledge.40 Addressing an issue that is particularly relevant in the
biotechnology field, Professors Fiona Murray and Scott Stern ask whether
patents lead to the “privatization” of scientific knowledge, removing it from
the public domain and stifling subsequent noncommercial research.41
Focusing on 340 peer-reviewed scientific articles published between 1997
and 1999 in the periodical Nature Biotechnology,42 they use a difference-indifference specification43 to measure the extent to which the number of

38

Id. at 551 (“Without successful disclosure, the same inventor will be more likely to continue
building up on his original invention because he will be the one with the best information to do so. In
fact, inventors appear to innovate based only on the information they already have when other information
is difficult to acquire. Ineffective disclosure, by extension, can also prolong the patent right beyond its
stated expiration because more of the useful information about an invention remains only in the patentee’s
hands.”).
39 The “anti-commons effect” is a term used to connote negative effects of widespread private
ownership and wealth that reduces public resources.
40 Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
648 (2007).
41 Id. at 649, 654.
42 Id. at 651.
43 A difference-in-difference specification is a regression procedure that analyzes the causal effect
of an event on a sample of a population. Generally speaking, it compares the difference between the
affected sample and unaffected sample of the population before versus after the event in question.
Difference in Differences, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Difference_in_differences [https://
perma.cc/KQD2-RHBK].
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subsequent scientific publications to these articles changes following
issuance of a complementary patent covering the published information.44
Exploiting the fact that half of their sample involved complementary
paper–patent pairs45 and the patents issued on average more than three years
following initial publication of the corresponding paper,46 Professors Murray
and Stern measure the change in future publications conditional on the patent
grant, and they find a statistically significant but “modest” decline.47
Accordingly, they conclude that there is some evidence of an “anticommons” effect on future scientific research.48 However, the authors do not
study the effects of patenting on future patented technological development,
which is the focus of the present study. Additionally, in absolute numbers,
they find that the articles that were originally complemented by a patent gave
rise to more future scientific publications than the unpatented set, despite the
observed post-grant decline, which arguably suggests that papers with
patents do more to promote future technological progress than papers
without patent complements.49
In 2013, Professor Heidi Williams conducted another study of the
perceived anti-commons effect of patents on future scientific research in the
biotechnology field.50 Focusing on the industry-wide effort to sequence the
human genome in the 1990s,51 Professor Williams compares subsequent
scientific publications and diagnostic tests based on public domain genes,
which were disclosed for public use as part of the Human Genome Project,52
to publications and tests based on genes first sequenced by a private firm,
which charged access fees for use.53 Professor Williams found that the genes

44

Murray & Stern, supra note 40, at 650.
Id. at 651.
46 Id. (“For those articles that ultimately receive a patent, there is a significant lag between scientific
publication and patent grant (on average, more than 3 years).”).
47 Id. (“[T]hough the size of the effect is modest, the approach and results do seem to provide
empirical evidence consistent with the anti-commons effect.”).
48 Id. at 673.
49 Id. at 651 (“[P]ublished articles also associated with formal IP are more highly cited than those
whose authors choose not to file for patents; however, most of this boost is accounted for by observed
characteristics such as author location and number of authors on the article.”).
50 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human
Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2013).
51 Id. at 2.
52 Id. at 10.
53 Id. at 2. Notably, the firm did not charge for research access. Id. at 11 (“Academic researchers
were free to use Celera’s data for noncommercial research and academic publications.”).
45
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commercialized by the private firm were cited in scientific publications less
frequently than those first published by the public effort.54
Notably, however, given that the public race to sequence the entire
genome prioritized the sequencing of the most valuable genes, the genes first
sequenced by the private firm were considerably less valuable than those of
the Human Genome Project.55 Also, it was well-known in the industry that
the Project would complete sequencing of the entire genome by 2003, at
which point all genes would be publicly available,56 which in turn influenced
selection and outcomes. Finally, Professor Williams’s study does not address
patents—the private firm used contractual arrangements to capture value
from its genes prior to public sequencing, and the variable includes scientific
research publications and developed diagnostic tests but not patents.57
Accordingly, Professor Williams’s study, like Professors Murray and
Stern’s, does not directly address cumulative innovation of patented
technologies, which is the focus of the present inquiry.
In 2015, Professors Bhaven Sampat and Williams conducted a study
focusing specifically on the effect of gene patents on future scientific
research and clinical trials.58 Addressing concerns over cumulative
innovation in biotechnology,59 including the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
certain gene patent claims on the basis that they “would ‘tie up’ . . . such
tools and . . . inhibit future innovation,”60 Professors Sampat and Williams
analyze the impact of the issuance of a patent on the number of subsequent
research publications and clinical drug trials related to the patented gene.61
To do so, they identify approximately 1500 patent applications filed between
2000 and 2005 that claim human gene sequences,62 and they compare the
54 Id. at 3 (“Celera genes had an average of 1.2 publications by 2009, relative to 2.1 publications for
non-Celera genes sequenced in the same year.”).
55 Id. at 12 (“[G]enes initially sequenced by the public effort had higher ex ante expected value than
genes initially sequenced by Celera.”).
56 Id. at 11 (“[I]t was publicly known in 2001 that all of Celera’s genes would be resequenced by the
public effort, and thus move into the public domain, by 2003.”).
57 Id. at 2–3.
58 Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence
from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679705 [https://perma.cc/AQ2Y-SX45].
59 Id. at 1 (“Our broad goal is to inform whether the Nordhaus-style trade-off between ex ante
incentives and deadweight loss is sufficient for optimal patent policy design, or whether—at least in this
context—the effects of patents on follow-on innovation need to be considered.”).
60 Id. at 29 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589
(2013)) (emphasis omitted).
61 Id. at 2 (“Specifically, we measure the scientific publications related to each gene as an indicator
of scientific research investments, and measure the use of genes in pharmaceutical clinical trials and
diagnostic tests as indicators of commercial research investments.”).
62 Id. at 39.
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number of future publications and clinical trials based on genes on which the
patents issued versus applications that were rejected.63 Also, to control for
inherent quality factors that may produce a correlation between the outcome
of an application and downstream impact, irrespective of patent rights, they
use the historic leniency of each United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) examiner as an instrument for observing future impact conditioned
solely on whether patent rights were granted.64
Their results are particularly relevant to the present study in the
following ways. Despite concerns that patents may impede cumulative
development,65 Professors Sampat and Williams find no statistical difference
between the future scientific research publications and clinical development
relating to patented genes compared to genes that remained in the public
domain.66 As with the previous studies, they do not observe the effects of
patents on future patented technologies, relying only on evidence from
publications and clinical development.
Each of the foregoing studies provides relevant results speaking to the
impact of patents on future scientific research and development, as well as
useful methodological guidance. However, these studies do not speak to the
impact of patents on future patented technological progress. By contrast, the
study discussed in the next Section addresses cumulative patented innovation
as a function of patent invalidation.
D. Empirical Studies of Patent Validity and Cumulative Innovation
Patent law provides a convenient lens through which to observe the
impact of a patent upon future technology. When applying for a patent,
inventors have a duty to disclose prior patents of which they are aware that
relate to the claimed invention.67 Additionally, the USPTO examiner
searches for relevant prior patents each time she reviews a new application,
and the patent that issues makes reference to the results.68 By tallying the
63

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 3.
65 Id. at 4.
66 Id. at 3 (“In contrast with what one would infer from a naïve comparison of follow-on innovation
on patented and non-patented genes, both of our quasi-experimental approaches suggest that gene patents
have not had quantitatively important effects on either follow-on scientific research or follow-on
commercial investments.”).
67 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018) (applicant’s duty of candor to disclose information material to
patentability). The duty to cite a relevant patent does not depend on the cited patent’s validity. See Galasso
& Schankerman, supra note 8, at 329 (“Importantly for our purposes, the expiration or invalidation of a
patent has no impact on its prior art status (35 U.S. Code, section 102), so the requirement to cite it
remains in place.”).
68 See generally Juan Alcácer et al., Applicant and Examiner Citations in U.S. Patents: An Overview
and Analysis, 38 RES. POL’Y 415 (2009) (discussing examiner citations).
64

955

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

number of future patents issuing from these applications that cite a given
patent (commonly known as “forward citations”), one can study the original
patent’s impact on future technologies.
Forward citations are a widely used measure of the progress of patented
technology.69 Notably, however, these citations are not a perfect measure of
cumulative innovation, and they may lack precision in certain contexts. As
Professors Alberto Galasso and Mark Schankerman write: “Citations can
either under- or overestimate the extent of follow-on innovation. They will
underestimate it where inventors develop improvements that are not patented
(or patentable), but overestimate it when the inventor did not actually built
on the prior patent.”70 Nonetheless, forward citations are widely used as
aggregate measures of levels of innovation, particularly where, as here, one
compares citations received by similarly situated patents.71 A recent study
uses forward citations to analyze the impact of patent invalidation upon
subsequent patented technology development across a broad range of fields,
and this study provides a useful roadmap for the analysis herein. In their 2014
study, Professors Galasso and Schankerman investigated the change in
patent forward citations received by 1258 patents the Federal Circuit had
invalidated or upheld.72 Specifically, they measured whether invalidation
causes an increase or decrease in post-adjudication citations to the patent,
controlling for technology value73 and other factors.74 In their first-order
regression model (without controlling for possible endogeneity, as described
below), they find no difference in the absolute number of citations received
by invalidated versus upheld patents.75
However, in order to identify the true effect of invalidation, they must
overcome endogeneity in their dataset. Endogeneity in regression analysis
can be thought of as a circular relationship between the dependent and

69 Abrams et al., supra note 8, at 1; Akcigit et al., supra note 8, at 3 (using citations to measure
cumulative innovation); Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 329 (“We use the number of citations
by subsequent patents to the focal patent as a measure of cumulative innovation. . . . Citations have been
widely used in the economics of innovation literature as a proxy for follow-on research and are the only
practical measure of cumulative innovation for studies such as ours that cover a wide range of technology
fields.”); Hall et al., supra note 8, at 16.
70 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 357.
71 Id. at 354 (discussing their study design using forward citations as the primary dependent variable).
72 Id. at 330.
73 Id. at 333 (“To control for heterogeneity in the value that the patent has for the patentee and followon inventors, we include the number of claims and the number of external and self citations received prior
to the Federal Circuit decision (PreCites and PreSelfCites, respectively) as covariates in the regression.”).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 339 (“We begin in column (1) by presenting the OLS estimate of the baseline specification
relating external citations in a five-year window after the court decision to the invalidity dummy and
additional controls. There is no significant correlation between patent invalidation and future citations.”).
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independent variables, which may result in significant relationships being
observed incorrectly. For example, the possibility that an increase in the
value of the technology during the patent’s lifetime could drive both an
increase in future citations and extra effort by the patent owner to avoid
invalidation.76 Accordingly, they employ what is known as an “instrument”
to separate out the two possible effects and measure only the impact of
invalidation on subsequent citations. Specifically, they construct an
instrument based on the relative bias of the Federal Circuit panel hearing
each appeal to observe the marginal unbiased effects of invalidation on
future citations.77
Their findings cast doubt on the notion that patents generally tend to
impede subsequent technological innovation.78 Although they find a
statistically significant increase in post-invalidation citations, this effect is
driven by new patenting in a few very specific circumstances.79 In particular,
it is “concentrated among a small subset of [invalidated] patents,”80 where
there is new entry81 into a few specific complex82 technology markets, and
where the invalidated patent was owned by a large firm.83 Additionally, the
effect is concentrated on “stronger patents,” which have a lower probability
of being held invalid—that is, patents which were invalidated
unexpectedly.84 Arguably, this demonstrates rent-seeking behavior on the
part of new entrants, who file new patent applications to compete for market
share after a larger firm’s strong patent has been invalidated.85
76
Id. at 334 (“The major empirical challenge is that the decision by the Federal Circuit to invalidate
a patent is endogenous. For example, a positive shock to the value of the underlying technology may
increase citations to a patent and, at the same time, induce the patentee to invest heavily in the case to
avoid invalidation.”).
77 Id. at 334–35.
78 Id. at 321 (“[W]e find that the impact of patent invalidation on subsequent innovation is highly
heterogeneous. For most patents, the marginal treatment effect of invalidation is not statistically different
from zero.”).
79 Id. at 341 (“[The] average effect is misleading because it hides the fact that the ‘blocking effect’
of patent rights is highly heterogeneous.”).
80 Id. at 348.
81 Id. at 345 (“The estimated time path is more compatible with a story of entry of new innovators,
previously blocked, developing technology building on the focal patent.”).
82 Id. at 352 (“[T]he fragmentation of patent ownership and complexity of technology fields are key
empirical determinants of the relationship between patent rights and cumulative innovation.”).
83 Id. at 354 (“[T]he blocking effect of invalidation is concentrated exclusively on citations that
patents of large firms receive from small innovators.”).
84 Id. at 321.
85 Notably, their study does not demonstrate whether the new entry demonstrates significant
technological advances over the prior state of the art, nor do they provide evidence that the dominant firm
had allowed technology to stagnate prior to invalidation. Id. at 341 n.20; Alberto Galasso & Mark
Schankerman, Patents Rights and Innovation by Small and Large Firms (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 2694725, 2015) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694725
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Unlike the present study, Professors Galasso and Schankerman do not
measure the lifetime citations of the patents in their study, focusing only on
the change in citations before and after invalidation.86 They also do not
analyze the basis on which the patent is invalidated. As discussed below, the
criteria for patent validity are closely related to information content, and the
reason why a patent is invalidated may shed light on whether patent rights
restrict or promote future development of the technical information they
disclose.
More generally, Professors Galasso and Schankerman focus on the
invalidation of a patent as a useful event for studying how the loss of
exclusivity over patented information affects future innovation. This study
takes a different approach by treating the later-adjudicated validity or
invalidity of a patent as an observable indicator of the inherent features of
the patent, features which exist at the time the patent issues and which may
impact subsequent cumulative innovation over the lifetime of the patent.
E. Using Validity Decisions to Observe Inherent Patent Characteristics
This study uses a court’s decision on validity as a way of identifying
patents that possess certain otherwise unobservable characteristics and
distinguishing them from patents that lack them. Using this filter, this study
investigates whether these underlying characteristics result in significant
differences in the cumulative innovation relating to these patents over their
entire lifetimes, from issuance through the adjudication of validity and
beyond. Then, finally, the details of the entire set of patents are mined to try
to register these characteristics directly, and thereby explain the observed
effects on technological progress.
This study further posits that the criteria for patent validity provide an
ideal lens for studying the information disclosure function of patents, which
facilitates the analysis below.87 To be valid, a patent must disclose new and
useful technical information pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter,88

[https://perma.cc/Y7PQ-62KU] (“Patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent decrease in patenting by the
patent holder, on average, but the impact depends critically on characteristics of the patentee and the
competitive environment. The effect is entirely driven by small innovative firms in technology fields
where they face many large incumbents. Invalidation of patents held by large firms does not change the
intensity of their innovation but shifts the technological direction of their subsequent patenting.”).
86 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 333.
87 See Scotchmer & Green, supra note 33, at 131 (“The legal requirements of ‘novelty’ and
‘nonobviousness’ . . . determine the value of patent protection, the incentives for research, and how much
technical information is shared among firms through patenting.”).
88 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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which is both novel89 and not obvious in light of the prior art.90 The disclosure
must also be sufficiently clear and detailed91 to enable practitioners to make
and use embodiments of the claimed invention.92 These statutory
requirements test both the extent and quality of a patent’s information
disclosure, and in turn, they provide a useful lens for this study.
In particular, this study uses the requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, and the clarity and enablement of the specification as
statutory filters for information disclosure. Novelty under § 102 requires
“each and every element” of the patent to be present in a single prior art
reference.93 Accordingly, novelty can serve as a filter for the newness of the
technical information disclosed in a patent. Nonobviousness under § 103
permits multiple prior art references to be combined, where applicable, to
cover the elements of the invention.94 For purposes of this study,
nonobviousness serves as a similar proxy to novelty, but one would expect a
patent that is invalidated on the basis of novelty might contribute less to
cumulative innovation, as all of the information therein was previously
disclosed in the prior art. By contrast, the statutory requirements under § 112
test the clarity of the written description,95 and they further require the patent
applicant to provide sufficient detail to enable others to practice the
invention.96 This can generally be thought of as testing the clarity of the
disclosure, including whether it enables others to practice the invention. One
might expect patents invalidated under § 112 but not under § 102 or § 103 to
contribute more to technological progress, to the extent the information
therein is novel and nonobvious (albeit perhaps unclear).
89

Id. § 102.
Id. § 103. “Prior art” generally refers to previously issued patents and publications according to
the statutory requirements.
91 Id. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out
the invention.”).
92 Id.
93 Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is
anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently
described, in a single prior art reference.”).
94 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 32 (1966); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
95 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We now
reaffirm that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from
enablement . . . .”).
96 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is well established that enablement requires
that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.”).
90
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Finally, I again emphasize that this study is not examining the effect of
invalidation on cumulative innovation, but rather validity is treated as a
property of a patent in order to examine what that indicates regarding the
information disclosed therein. That is, if valid patents disclose more new and
useful technical information, and if greater disclosure by a patent gives rise
to more future invention despite the exclusivity of that patent, then the
analysis below should observe valid patents receiving more forward citations
than invalid patents, all else equal.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Empirical Challenges
This study’s analysis faces four key challenges. First, both invalid and
valid patents that are adjudicated in court are likely to have many more
forward citations than the average patent.97 Litigated patents receive more
citations, which corresponds in part to heightened competition between
technology producers in contested markets.98 Litigated patents are also more
likely to have higher private value to their owners,99 which is also reflected
in high citation counts.100 Moreover, the dataset is selecting from the most
contentious and high-stakes cases, where the parties litigated without
settlement to the point of a judge or jury determination on validity.
Therefore, one would expect high average citation counts for all patents in
the dataset, irrespective of their validity.101
Second, any difference between the forward citations of valid and
invalid patents is likely to be quite subtle. At least two recent studies did not
observe statistically significant differences in citation counts of valid versus
invalid patents. In a 2014 cross-sectional study of non-practicing entity
97 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO.
L.J. 435, 455 (2004) [hereinafter Allison et al., Valuable Patents]; see also Alan C. Marco & Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 111 n.37 (2013) (citing Colleen V. Chien,
Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 304–06, 316–17, 320–21 (2011)) (“A higher number
of forward citations is correlated with a greater incidence of litigation.”).
98 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 138 (2001) (analyzing how a high number of citations indicates an
increased level of competition in that patent’s marketplace).
99 See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 439–41; Hall et al., supra note 8, at 19;
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 98, at 137; Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 110–11
(discussing the relationship between intrinsic and acquired qualities of a patent, including forward
citations, and incidence of litigation, a proxy for patent value).
100 Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 455; see also John R. Allison et al., Patent
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 710 (2011).
101 High average citation counts suggest high variability across the distribution of citations,
potentially making it harder to observe differences between the two sets of patents.
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(NPE) cases with matching non-NPE cases,102 Professor Michael Risch
found no difference in forward citations across a dataset comprising 352
NPE patents and a matching set of 791 patents, produced by sampling over
twenty years of cases.103 However, that study was designed to identify
distinguishing characteristics of NPE litigations, and it did not analyze a
comprehensive sample of cases adjudicating validity.
Professors John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz also
observed no significant differences in forward citations between patents
asserted in cases filed in 2008 and 2009.104 Their dataset was both over- and
underinclusive with respect to validity, as it contained many cases in which
no decision on validity was rendered and also omitted many cases filed in
other years that adjudicated validity.105 Nonetheless, these studies teach that
any citation differences between valid and invalid patents, if they exist, are
likely to be small.
Third, even if a difference between citations received by valid and
invalid patents is observed, it might have nothing to do with the information
content of these patents. Patents may be invalidated for reasons that have
nothing to do with the novelty or extent of the technical information they
disclose.106 Each litigant’s efforts to secure its position may influence the
court’s holding on validity, irrespective of the merits of the patent itself.107
Like other studies of cumulative innovation,108 this study must address
potential endogeneity and other factors that could confound observations.
The analysis below employs a variety of statistical techniques and design
strategies to test the results.
Finally, the effect of an invalidation decision may itself influence future
citation counts, which could have an effect on the lifetime citation counts
that are observed. A patent that has been invalidated continues to function as
prior art, but no longer poses an infringement risk to subsequent inventors.
In turn, these inventors are motivated to cite invalidated patents, because
doing so could preempt future invalidity challenges to their own patents
without any risk that the owner of the invalid cited patents will accuse them
of infringement.109 Additionally, as Professors Galasso and Schankerman
102

Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (2015).
Id. at 84, 89, 117–20.
104 John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1769, 1770, 1799 (2014).
105 Id. at 1776–77.
106 For example, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) sets the eligibility requirements for patentable subject
matter.
107 See infra Section III.C.
108 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8; Sampat & Williams, supra note 58.
109 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 364.
103
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demonstrate, new patenting is likely to occur under certain circumstances
after invalidation of certain types of strong patents, which also increases
forward citation counts.110 Both of these possible effects work in opposition
to the signal being sought here, as they would tend to increase the number of
forward citations received by invalid patents relative to valid patents.
Accordingly, they may further obfuscate any net positive relationship
between validity and citations that may exist.
As discussed in Sections III.B and III.C below, these issues are
addressed in the experimental design, analysis, and robustness tests
employed herein. Although only litigated patents are studied, this is true of
many studies of this type, and no claims are made about applicability of the
findings to the full population of patents whose validity is never challenged.
Careful testing and successive regression modeling are used to observe
differences between the valid and invalid patents in the dataset, and a large
sample size permits significance testing for even small observed differences
in citation counts. The basis for invalidation is controlled for, and direct
analysis of the information content of the patents is also conducted to
complete the picture. Finally, several tests are conducted to check and
control for endogeneity, including certain tests performed by Professors
Galasso and Schankerman and others.111 Taken together, the methodology
employed here is designed to address the concerns articulated and present
robust results.
B. Guiding Hypotheses
To overcome the challenges described above, the analysis is guided by
a series of successive hypotheses. They are as follows:
H1: Patented technical information is available for productive use during the
patent term.
H2: The number of future inventions that relate to an original invention
should increase with the extent of new technical information disclosed in the
original patent.
H3: The criteria for patent validity (particularly 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112)
scrutinize the novelty and effectiveness of a patent’s information disclosure.
H4: Accordingly, combining H2 and H3 implies that patents that are
invalidated may contain less productively useful information and therefore give
rise to fewer future inventions over their lifetimes (after controlling for
technology class, age, etc.).
H5: Additionally, patents with broader claims that are validly supported by
their disclosures are likely to contain more technical information than patents
110
111
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with narrower claims, given the statutory criteria above. Accordingly, the claim
breadth of valid patents should be positively correlated with the number of
future citations they receive.

The dataset construction and analysis below proceed sequentially from
these hypotheses, testing each in turn.
C. Description of the Dataset
The dataset used herein is compiled from a large sample of U.S. patents
that courts have held valid or invalid. The initial dataset comprises 1056 U.S.
federal district court patent cases published on Westlaw from 2004 through
2011112 in which a decision on liability or infringement was rendered at trial
or on summary judgment.113 Each decision is analyzed to determine whether
an express finding of validity was made, excluding findings of
noninfringement and procedural rulings where validity was not addressed.114
The dataset is further supplemented with additional searches on
DocketNavigator for validity rulings over the same time period, and the
results are cross-checked with Westlaw for consistency.115 Reversals on
appeal are controlled for to ensure that the final decision on validity is being
used to classify the patents.116

112 The underlying dataset is licensed from PricewaterhouseCoopers and used in their annual patent
litigation reports. See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION
STUDY: A CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES (2015), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensicservices/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP5W-WE49]. The
dataset contains 703 cases holding at least one of the asserted patents valid or invalid.
113 Cases that were dismissed on the pleadings are excluded, and only dispositive findings of patent
validity are retained. Also, although litigation intensity is not measured directly (e.g., such as by
measuring the number of docket entries in a given case), appeals are coded in subsequent analyses below
as a proxy to control for litigation intensity.
114 Notably, validity is adjudicated for each patent claim, and a single patent may contain some
claims that have been invalidated and some that have been held valid. This is rare, but to avoid multiple
records of the same patent, any patents with such overlap are excluded. Also, consistent with previous
studies, a patent is coded as invalid where any claim has been held invalid, and vice versa for valid claims.
See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 330 (describing their invalidated flag); see also Marco &
Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 115 (“[T]he question of validity may reasonably be framed as a binary
decision.”). Finally, design patents are excluded, as are unenforceability rulings, ownership disputes, and
other adjudications of ancillary matters.
115 DocketNavigator is used as a supplement to avoid potential underreporting of decisions in
Westlaw. Although it is impossible to ensure all validity decisions during the relevant time period are
being captured, using DocketNavigator as a redundancy allows improvement over using Westlaw as the
sole data source.
116 A small number of the cases upholding patents in the dataset did not expressly adjudicate validity
in their final written opinions, due to summary adjudications without opinion or failure by the defendant
to mount a meritorious claim of invalidity. Given that a defendant would challenge the validity of a patent
where possible, the failure to do so indicates that no potentially invalidating prior art was found and
justifies treating the patent as valid.
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Patents are filtered to require a minimum patent age of ten years as of
the time of study, resulting in the exclusion of patents that issued after
2006.117 This minimum age requirement largely avoids truncation of forward
citations. Forward citations accrue over time and are therefore highly timedependent,118 and citation counts in the early years of a patent’s term may be
a small fraction of the number expected over its full term.119 Observing at
least ten full years of citations largely circumvents the issue,120 and several
robustness checks are also employed to ensure age differences are not
driving results.121 This age selection also ensures that all included patents
appear in the current NBER patent dataset,122 which facilitates comparisons
with the full population of U.S. patents issuing in the same years and the
derivation of several meaningful metrics.
The resulting dataset comprises 416 valid and 502 invalid patents,123 for
a total of 918 patents, as shown below.124
117

Given the time period of cases, all of which were concluded before 2012, only a small number of
patents issued post-2006 were dropped. A small number of very old patents (pre-4,000,000 series) are
also excluded.
118 See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and
Methodological Tools 15–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA5H-QJUD] (measuring citations of the
population of issued patents and constructing metrics of generality and originality therefrom).
119 Id.; see also Alan C. Marco, The Dynamics of Patent Citations, 94 ECON. LETTERS 290, 291
(2007) (“Younger patents are bound to have fewer citations than otherwise identical older patents; that
is, the distribution of forward citations is truncated . . . .”).
120 Although there are statistical adjustments to compensate for truncation in certain applications, the
actual number of citations received must be observed in order to analyze true technological impact.
Contra Allison et al., supra note 104, at 1769 n.26 (not observing a difference between citations received
by valid versus invalid patents when using a statistical adjustment procedure to compensate for
truncation).
121 See infra Section III.B.
122 Patent
Data
Project,
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RES.,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject [https://perma.cc/8UYV-C723] (publishing forward
citation data and generating several useful metrics of a large population of U.S. patents issued until 2006).
123 Note that cases where the parties settled after a ruling on validity or invalidity may be
underrepresented if the ruling was not published in Westlaw and retrieved by these searches. Also, it
should be noted that valid patents are typically more difficult to identify in Westlaw than invalid patents,
which are marked by a red flag. Also, cases awarding liability for infringement may hold the underlying
patents valid during preliminary rulings prior to trial, and in some cases invalidity defenses may be
quickly dismissed, or not raised at all, if the accused infringer fails to find sufficient evidence of invalidity.
Explicit findings of validity are sought for each valid patent in the dataset, whether in the final opinion or
in preliminary rulings or dismissals of counterclaims, including cases where validity was not adjudicated
at trial (e.g., pretrial or in judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) rulings) and cases where the patents were
held valid and non-infringed. In any event, restricting the dataset to only patents that were explicitly held
valid in published opinions (excluding unpublished pretrial rulings and jury verdicts) should not alter
results given that most decisions involving material issues in dispute generally result in an opinion.
124 Another 616 different patents held valid or invalid by the Federal Circuit are also analyzed in
Section III.D below, for a total of 1534 patents.
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TABLE 1

Number
Percent of Total

Valid

Invalid

416
45.3%

502
54.7%

Three sets of variables are coded describing these patents, the cases
adjudicating them, and the forward citations they received. Case variables
include the decision date, court, basis for invalidity (if held invalid), and
whether the case was appealed. Patent variables include various intrinsic
attributes of the patents,125 such as the number of independent and dependent
claims, filing and issue dates, number of inventors, citations made to
previous patents (“backward citations”), and assignee information. The
technology class is also identified and coded using the six main categories
and thirty-six subcategories employed by Professors Bronwyn Hall, Adam
Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg.126 These categories were developed based on
the U.S. Patent Classifications (USPC) assigned to each patent by the
USPTO, and each subcategory aggregates several USPCs together based on
technology types.127 Then, the full document of each patent is retrieved from
Google Patents, from which additional details, such as textual characteristics
of the claims and written description, number of figures, backward citations
to non-patent literature, and identities and nationalities of the inventors, are
coded. Several acquired attributes, including assignments and liens recorded
against the patent, are also coded.
Next, a custom script is used to identify and retrieve all subsequent U.S.
patents issued before January 2016 that cite each patent in the dataset. Details
of these forward citations are coded, principally including the intrinsic
attributes identified above, when the citation was made during the term of
the cited patent, whether the citation was made by the USPTO examiner or
the applicant, whether the citing patent is assigned to the same party as the
cited patent (a “self-citation”) or a third party, and whether the citing patent
is in the same or a different technology class as the baseline patent. The
“generality” or technological variety of the forward citations received by
each patent is also calculated, using the methodology pioneered by
Professors Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg.128
See Chien, supra note 97, at 298–99 (describing various “intrinsic” and “acquired” attributes of
patents).
126 See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13; see also Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 338
(using these technology classes).
127 Hall et al., supra note 118, at 11–12.
128 See id. at 21 (calculating “generality” as the Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index (HHI) of
forward citations based on their technology fields).
125
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Finally, several variables are constructed using the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) database, which compare the patents in the
dataset to relevant subsets of the overall population. These include the
technology class concentration index based on the portfolio sizes of the top
four patent owners in each class,129 the number and details of all other patents
in the same filing year and technology class cohort, and comparisons of the
number of claims, duration of prosecution, and backward citations of patents
with their relevant cohorts.130
The principal dependent variable of interest is a binary flag indicating
whether the patent was held valid or invalid. The sign and magnitude of this
flag’s coefficient in the regression models described below indicates whether
there is a significant relationship between validity and citations. These
regressions principally use log-transformed citation counts to ensure
normality of the dependent variable in the regressions.131 Appendix A reports
relevant statistics of the patents and key citation measures.
III. INITIAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS132
Using the dataset constructed and variables coded as described above,
the next Part describes the analyses employed and robustness tests
conducted. In particular, the validity–citation relationship is modeled using
regression analysis, steps are taken to check and control for possible
selection bias, the potential for endogeneity is addressed, and finally, the
analysis is repeated on an independent dataset of valid and invalid patents.133

129 This is calculated using the HHI methodology employed by many, including Galasso and
Schankerman. See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 324–26.
130 See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing information variables).
131 This transformation is performed by taking the natural logarithm of the number of citations plus
one, following the methodology of Galasso and Schankerman, supra note 8, at 354. This converts the
citation distribution into a normal distribution, which is confirmed using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
which is a common method of testing for normality by checking whether two samples are drawn from
the same distribution.
132 For data visualization tools that allow for additional exploration of the data used in the Article,
visit the following link: https://nulr.shinyapps.io/patents. Materials are permanently archived at
https://doi.org/10.21985/N2KJ22.
133 The following software packages were used to conduct the analysis: Marek Hlavac, Stargazer:
Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables: R Package Version 5.2.2, CENTRAL
EUROPEAN LABOUR STUDIES INSTITUTE (CELSI) (2018), https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=
stargazer [https://perma.cc/A7WH-5D4A] (tables); Hadley Wickham, Tidyverse: Easily Install and Load
the
“Tidyverse”
Version
1.2.1,
R
STUDIO
(2017),
https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/tidyverse/index.html [https://perma.cc/5CXB-WQWQ]; and Hao Zhu,
KableExtra: Construct Complex Table with “kable” and Pipe Syntax, CRAN (2018), https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/kableExtra/index.html [https://perma.cc/GV5S-B7EB]. The following was
used for reference: Yihui Xie, knitr: A Comprehensive Tool for Reproducible Research in R, in
IMPLEMENTING REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH 3 (Victoria Stodden et al. eds., 2014).
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A. Modeling the Validity–Citation Relationship
Initial comparison of forward citation counts reveals that the valid
patents in the dataset received more forward citations than the invalid
patents.134 However, this does not necessarily correspond to technological
impact. Several factors influence citations, and the observed difference may
be driven by technology class,135 cohort characteristics,136 or the intrinsic
attributes of the patents themselves,137 irrespective of validity. Accordingly,
regression analysis is used and several robustness checks are performed to
control for these factors.
The first analysis constructs a multivariate log-linear regression model
of the citations received by each patent.138 In this model, the log-transformed
number of forward citations constitutes the dependent variable, and multiple
observed variables including the binary valid or invalid flag are used as
regressors. Forward citations are often associated with the value of the
underlying technology in its relevant market, which is not easily
observable.139 For this reason, consistent with other models of forward
citations, certain models include the number of citations received early in the
patent’s lifetime as a proxy for inherent technology value.140 Appendix B
reports details of the modeling procedure.
Each model reveals a significant positive relationship between validity
and the citation measure of interest. This holds true when the dependent
variable is restricted to citations made by USPTO examiners versus those
made by applicants. Previous studies exploring applicants’ incentives have
found that applicants may avoid searching for and citing relevant prior art
during patent prosecution.141 As shown in Appendix C, there is a significant
134

A t-test of the log-transformed citation counts reveals strong significance at the 0.1% level.
See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13 (discussing heterogeneity between subclasses).
136 See, e.g., Aditi Mehta et al., Identifying the Age Profile of Patent Citations: New Estimates of
Knowledge Diffusion, 25 J. APPLIED ECON. 1179, 1180–81 (2010) (discussing the cohort effect).
137 See, e.g., Nathan Falk & Kenneth Train, Patent Valuation with Forecasts of Forward Citations,
12 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 101, 117 (2017).
138 This uses an iterative procedure whereby variables are added successively and tested for improved
fit. Appendix B reports the results of successive models.
139 See Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 455 (identifying a strong relationship
between forward citations and litigation, which the authors use as a proxy for patent value); Michael J.
Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz & Jonathan H. Ashtor, Explaining the “Unpredictable”: An Empirical
Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 58, 63–66 (2013) (reporting the
correlation between forward citations and infringement awards).
140 See, e.g., Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 331 (noting that the number of claims and
citations per claim are commonly used indicators of patent value); Falk & Train, supra note 137, at 103
(discussing early citations as an indicator of future citations).
141 Alcácer et al., supra note 68, at 417 (“[F]irms’ decisions to search for prior art – and the resulting
‘quality’ of issued patents – are likely to reflect field-specific factors related to the value and use of patents
in those fields.”); Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y
135
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positive relationship between validity and each alternate citation measure.
This suggests that the observed relationship holds despite possible
tendencies of applicants to cite to fewer or selective patents.
Regressions are also run using only citations made by third parties,
excluding self-citations. Self-citations are citations made by patents owned
by the same applicant as the cited patent, and they may skew the results for
applicants that own large or dense patent portfolios. Concerns about the
possibility of patents impeding subsequent innovation often focus on
inventions made by third parties, on the theory that future improvements
made by the patent owner simply increase her individual private benefit.142
Both third-party citations and self-citations exhibit a significant positive
relationship with patent validity.143 This suggests that the relationship
between valid versus invalid patents and cumulative innovation is not limited
to cumulative developments made only by the same or third-party
applicants.144
B. Controlling for Selection Bias
To ensure robustness, several tests are run to confirm that the results are
not driven by the particular selection of the patents in the dataset. These tests
are described below, and the full results are provided in Appendix E.
First, if there is a significant average age difference between the valid
and invalid patents, truncation of forward citation counts could be a reason.
Analysis reveals a slight average age difference between the two sets.145 To
control for potential truncation, another flag is coded to identify the youngest
patents in the dataset and added to the regressions. Additionally, as a second
check, the regressions are rerun after excluding all patents for which the
truncation flag is true. Finally, the regressions are restricted to only citations

844, 851 (2013) (discussing evidence that applicants may not always comply with their duty of candor);
Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Grant Rate 10 (Jan. 3, 2009)
(manuscript
for
the
UC
Berkeley
Law
&
Econ.
Workshop),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/44n9w3gk#main
[https://perma.cc/T6ZZ-XPMA]
(finding that
applicants are more likely to search for prior art in certain technology fields than others).
142 Self-citations are a strong indicator of private patent value. See Allison et al., Valuable Patents,
supra note 97, at 454 (finding a strong relationship between self-citations and litigation); Hall et al., supra
note 8, at 31–33 (finding a strong relationship between self-citations and stock market value).
143 See infra Appendix C.
144 By contrast, Galasso and Schankerman, supra note 8, at 354, found that self-citations decreased
to certain patents held by large applicants post-invalidation, whereas third-party citations by new market
entrants increased. Those findings reflect market dynamics and the effect of patents on competition,
whereas the present results suggest that the relationship between validity and cumulative innovation is
perhaps more a function of technological importance.
145 The average issue year is 1998 for valid and 2000 for invalid patents. (The median issue year is
1999 for valid and 2000 for invalid patents).
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received during the first ten years of the patents’ term, for which there is full
data given the minimum age requirement in the dataset construction.146 The
coefficient on the validity flag remains strongly significant and positive in
each of these tests. Accordingly, this shows that the findings above are not
the result of age truncation in forward citations received by the valid versus
invalid patents in the dataset.
It is also possible that the dataset randomly includes more valid patents
with high citation counts and more invalid patents with low citation counts.
Although this is unlikely to arise at random given the large sample size, it
can be controlled for by successively excluding valid and invalid patents
with the highest five, ten, and twenty percent of citation counts relative to
their respective distributions. The findings above are robust across each cut.
For good measure, the top fifty percent are also excluded as the next step,
and then this filter is flipped to exclude the bottom fifty percent from each
set, but neither test changes the results. This shows that an imbalance of
many highly cited patents in the set of valid or invalid patents is not driving
the results.
The next robustness check compares the intrinsic attributes of each
valid and invalid patent to check for significant differences between the two
sets. There is no statistical difference between the number of total and
independent claims, length of the written description or abstract, or number
of inventors, after controlling for technology class, age, and filing year.
There is also no significant difference in the number of backward citations.147
Finally, there is a major source of selection bias that is not being
controlled for: namely, that the dataset is selected only from patents that have
been asserted by their owners and fully litigated to an adjudication of
validity. Asserted patents have been found to be among the most valuable,148
and rational parties are likely to litigate fully in the face of high uncertainty
as to the expected outcome or unusually high personal stakes.149 However,
both of these forms of selection bias are likely to affect the valid and invalid
patents equally and are therefore unlikely to skew the results—that is, they
should not result in more citations received by one group relative to the other.
Moreover, it is impossible to study differences between valid and invalid

146
147

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C (overall backward citations are negative when controlling for relevant prior

art).
148 See Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 439; see also Allison et al., Patent Quality
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, supra note 100, at 680 (analyzing the value of litigated
patents relative to nonlitigated patents).
149 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 5, 16–17 (1984).
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patents without relying on adjudications of validity, given that prior to
adjudication, all patents are presumed valid.150
C. Addressing Endogeneity
Despite robustness across a variety of citation measures and
subsamples, unobserved factors could drive the relationship between validity
and citations. For example, efforts of the patent owner in the litigation may
influence the final outcome on validity, and a patent owner may fight harder
to protect her patent if it has higher private value (which corresponds to a
higher expected citation count). Professors Galasso and Schankerman
address this form of endogeneity in their 2014 study, writing that “a positive
shock to the value of the underlying technology may increase citations to a
patent and, at the same time, induce the patentee to invest heavily in the case
to avoid invalidation.”151
This particular concern is somewhat less relevant to the present study
given that lifetime citations are being used here. As mentioned above,
Professors Galasso and Schankerman are observing the difference between
pre- and post-litigation citations for patents that were invalidated versus
patents that were upheld,152 and late-stage increases in technology value may
obscure the relationship between invalidation and new entry from previously
blocked competitors.153 By contrast, this study observes citations accruing
over the lifetime of a patent from birth, meaning that late-stage changes,
however caused, will have less relative impact on overall citation counts.
Nonetheless, the effects of late-stage increases in technology value can
further be ruled out by restricting analysis to the first few years of the patent
term. Citations received during the early years of the patent’s lifespan arise
before the patent is adjudicated and, in many cases, before technology value
is even apparent. Accordingly, restricting the dependent variable to citations
received in the first two, three, and five years of the patent’s term,
respectively, reveals that valid patents still receive significantly more
citations than invalid patents during these limited time periods. The results
of this analysis are shown in Appendix D.
Still, it is possible that patent owners may have superior knowledge
about the value of their patents early on, leading them to fight harder to
150

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 334.
152 Id. at 329–33 (describing their main regression specification).
153 For instance, a finding of validity due to a patent owner’s efforts to protect a patent that has
increased in value would register as a positive relationship between post-adjudication citations and
validity, and new entry after a blocking patent is invalidated would likewise register as a positive
relationship between citations and invalidity. Id. at 334 (discussing endogeneity in their dataset).
151
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protect patents that have greater inherent value. However, effort alone does
not guarantee outcome.154 Indeed, studies of patent litigation have found that
litigation outcomes are not predominantly determined by party effort.155 For
example, both parties are likely to fight harder when the stakes are high,
meaning that increased effort by the patent owner is likely to be met by
corresponding extra effort by his or her opponent.156
Several additional tests can also be employed to rule out the possibility
that endogeneity is affecting the results. First, if patent owners fight harder
to protect patents that have higher value from issuance, then the early few
years of forward citations can be used as a proxy to identify and exclude
these patents. Running successive regressions excluding the top ten, twenty,
thirty, forty, and fifty percent of patents by early citation count157
demonstrates that the relationship between validity and citations is invariant
to early technology value. The results are shown in Appendix D.
Details of the litigation itself can also be used as a proxy for litigant
effort. The decision to appeal a case requires additional investments of time
and money, and parties may be more likely to commit these resources when
the patents are more valuable. Several alternative regressions are run
excluding cases that were appealed, cases where the patent owner appealed
the district court’s finding of invalidity, and cases where the accused
infringer appealed the district court’s finding of validity. As shown in
Appendix D, the results hold consistent across each subset of cases.
Finally, a direct statistical test can also be conducted to further rule out
endogeneity. Following a similar methodology to that employed by

154 In particular, it seems unrealistic to think that the strong positive relationship observed across
more than 900 patents adjudicated during an eight-year timespan of court decisions is driven
systematically by the litigation efforts of patent owners. Moreover, despite the endogeneity in Professors
Galasso and Schankerman’s dataset, their ordinary least squares (OLS) regression revealed no significant
correlation between patent invalidation and subsequent citations, id. at 339, suggesting that the absolute
effect of endogeneity is not overwhelming relative to other factors.
155 See Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent
Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 233–34 (2016) (finding litigant efforts are generally equal and
finding no relation between effort and outcome); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent
Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 311 (2006) (examining patent case complexity and measures of litigant
expenditures); see also Priest & Klein, supra note 149, at 5 (1984) (predicting that case outcomes should
generally be random given the selection of disputes into litigation).
156 See Ashtor, supra note 155, at 233–34. Moreover, patents are presumed valid in litigation, and
the burden of proving invalidity falls not on the patent owner but on her opponent. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(2012). Thus, if anything, the final outcome is more likely susceptible to the effort expended by the
opponent in searching for invalidating prior art.
157 Specifically, each cut excludes the relevant percentage of all patents (valid and invalid
combined); however, percentages are computed relative to the distributions of each technology class to
avoid changing the technology composition of the dataset.
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Professors Galasso and Schankerman,158 the test requires modeling the
suspected endogenous variable (validity) using an instrument that strongly
correlates with it. The unexplained variation from this model (estimated by
residual values) represents unobservable factors, such as litigant effort and
other endogenous effects. Including these residuals as a regressor in the
model of forward citations tests whether these effects are significantly
influencing citation counts.
The instrument is constructed by recognizing that many patents are
invalidated when new prior art, not cited during examination, is found during
litigation.159 Accordingly, patents that fail to cite potentially relevant prior art
may be more susceptible to being invalidated.160 Using the NBER dataset,
patents in the same filing year and technology class cohort are identified that
cite one or more prior art references in common with the dataset patents, and
the extent of backward citations made by the dataset patents are compared to
the distribution of citations made by their peers.161 As shown in Appendix D,
this instrument is significantly associated with patent validity, all else
equal.162 Adding the residuals from this model to the forward citations
regression with the same controls reveals no evidence of strong endogeneity
between validity and citations in the dataset.
D. Independent Verification
Finally, another test is conducted to further ensure that the observed
results are not biased by endogeneity or idiosyncrasies of the original dataset.
Specifically, the results are replicated on an independent dataset of patents
held valid or invalid. This is compiled from the set of all of the Federal
158 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 339 n.18, (citing Douglas Rivers & Quang H.
Vuong, Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models, 39 J.
ECONOMETRICS 347 (1988)); see also JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 506–36 (4th ed. 2009) (describing a similar test with linear regression models).
159 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (finding that patents are more likely to be invalidated on the basis of prior
art that was not before the USPTO); see also Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity,
37 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 331–32 (2008) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d
1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
160 See Yan Liu et al., Latent Graphical Models for Quantifying and Predicting Patent Quality
17 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 1145, 1149 (2011),
https://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/files/us-kclang/Patent%20Quality%20KDD%202011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BVK-8DC8] (using prior art citations in a model to predict patent validity).
161 Specifically, the number of standard deviations from the mean of the backward citations is
computed for each of the dataset patents relative to its peer group.
162 As reported by Risch, the coefficient on the overall number of backward citations in the validity
model is negative, indicating that more citations correlate with a lower likelihood of validity. Risch, supra
note 102, at 70 (finding a negative correlation between backward citations and validity).
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Circuit’s validity opinions that are published on Westlaw from 1990 through
2012.163 Using the same filters to exclude patents that are younger than ten
years from issuance,164 383 valid and 443 invalid patents remain. A full set
of variables is coded for each of these patents, using the same procedure
described above for the original dataset.
Running the regressions above, using this appellate dataset, finds that
these valid patents also receive significantly more lifetime citations than the
invalid patents. However, the full appellate set includes some degree of
overlap with the original dataset (i.e., patents that were appealed during the
relevant time period).165 Filtering out these patents leaves 308 unique valid
patents and the same number of invalid patents. Repeating the regressions
on only the unique portion of the appellate dataset again reveals a significant
positive relationship between validity and forward citations.
There is some heterogeneity between appealed patents and those
adjudicated only at the district court level. Combining the datasets, and
coding interaction flags indicating whether the patent was held valid by the
district court or on appeal, reveals that appealed valid patents have lower
average citation counts than non-appealed valid patents. This makes sense,
because parties are more likely to appeal a case where validity is less
certain.166 In turn, if the hypothesis above about validity and information
content holds true, then one would expect more questionable validity to
correspond to lower information content, which in turn may result in a
weaker impact on future technologies.
E. Illustration of Results
This Section illustrates the results using a series of plots.167 This starts
with the most revealing picture, which shows average lifetime citations
accruing over the patent term for valid and invalid patents, respectively.
Figure 1 clearly shows the strong positive relationship between validity and
citations, and the continuity of this relationship throughout the patent term.

163 To facilitate analysis, cases that affirmed the district court’s holding without written opinion are
excluded.
164 Also, as above, a small number of very old patents (pre-4,000,000 series) are excluded.
165 There are 210 patents in the original dataset that overlap with the Federal Circuit dataset.
166 This follows from the same logic that disputes are more likely to be litigated in the first instance
where the outcome is uncertain. See Priest & Klein, supra note 149, at 45.
167 Although figures in two dimensions cannot fully reflect multivariate analysis, the figures in this
Section are useful to identify key features and guide the analysis of information content below.
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FIGURE 1: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT VALIDITY
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The next figure separates citations made by applicants from those made
by USPTO examiners and shows these citation patterns side by side. Both
applicant and examiner citations exhibit a positive relationship with validity.
This result should be viewed in light of recent findings that USPTO
examiners tend to rely on the prior art they find during their own searches,
rather than references submitted by applicants, in making substantive
anticipation and obviousness rejections of patent applications.168

168 See Cotropia et al., supra note 141, at 851 (“Another possible explanation is that examiners are
myopic: focusing on the art that they find.”).

974

113:943 (2019)

Patented Information

FIGURE 2: FORWARD CITATIONS BY CITATION SOURCE AND PATENT VALIDITY
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Next, the data are split according to the six main technology categories
defined by Professors Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg: Chemical, Computers &
Communications, Drugs & Medical, Electrical & Electronics, Mechanical,
and Others.169 Each category-specific distribution is illustrated using box
plots, superimposing valid and invalid patents. Note that median lines are
illustrated, and differences in means (all of which are larger for valid patents)
are provided in the labels. This shows generally that the results are most
prevalent in certain technology fields, as discussed further below.

169

Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13.
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FIGURE 3: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT TECHNOLOGY CLASS AND VALIDITY

Figure 3 illustrates some heterogeneity across technology classes, and
class-specific regressions only reveal a statistically significant effect in the
Chemical (ten-percent level), Computers & Communications (five-percent
level), and Drugs & Medical (one-percent level) classes; the Others class
also appears nearly significant (approximately the twenty-five-percent
level). Repeating the analysis with the full set of patents using a set of
interaction variables that identify the valid patents in each class avoids the
low data counts of the class-specific regressions, and it reveals that all but
two classes, Electrical & Electronic (p-val=0.379) and Mechanical (pval=0.911), are significant or nearly significant at the ten-percent level.170

170
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Moreover, those two classes still have relatively small sample sizes and low
overall citation counts, which are expected to contribute to the lack of
significance.
The preceding analysis identifies and investigates the relationship
between patent validity and cumulative innovation. The next Part will
examine a possible reason underlying the observed relationship based on
differing levels of information content between valid and invalid patents.
IV. INFORMATION CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT
The next set of analyses investigates whether the relationship observed
above between validity and citations corresponds to differences in the
information content of the patents. In particular, this seeks to determine
whether patents held valid disclose more and/or higher quality technical
information to subsequent inventors than patents held invalid and whether
this in turn generates more future citing patents. The analyses find striking
evidence of the anticipated relationship between information content and
cumulative innovation.
First, it is helpful to briefly describe the theory behind how the
information content of a patent is transmitted to other inventors. Both
Professors Romer and Scotchmer claim that inventors read existing patents
for inspiration and guidance in developing new inventions.171 However,
literal transmission might not occur in all instances, particularly because
inventors often have incentives to avoid reviewing prior patents.172
Nonetheless, inventors may observe embodiments of patented inventions on
the market and derive inspiration thereby.173 And corporate R&D
departments may reverse engineer the patented products of their competitors

171 Romer, supra note 28, at S84 (“[O]ther inventors are free to spend time studying the patent
application for the widget and learn knowledge that helps in the design of a [widget].”); Scotchmer, supra
note 33, at 39 (“[D]isclosure . . . is the vehicle by which technical knowledge is passed from the patenting
firm to its competitors.”); id. at 39 n.16.
172 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Willfulness enhances an infringer’s potential liability
if she has prior knowledge of the patent, creating a disincentive to search for prior art. See Mark A.
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085,
1085 (2003).
173 One principal function of the patent system is to provide incentives for commercialization of new
technologies by facilitating downstream development and coordination of resources necessary to bring
new products to market. See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 328–
29 (2006) (discussing how patents facilitate coordination of development resources). See generally
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (theorizing
how patents facilitate downstream development and commercialization).
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to learn from their designs.174 Thus, patents facilitate literal knowledge
transfer through their written descriptions as well as tacit knowledge transfer
through embodiments of their claimed inventions. Patents are arguably
uniquely situated for such knowledge transfer given the disclosure
requirements imposed by patent law.
The analysis below employs two strategies to observe the relationship
between the information content of a patent and its impact on future
technological progress. First, the statutory criteria of patent validity are used
to examine whether adjudicated failures of information disclosure
correspond with reduced technological impact. Next, direct measurements of
the information disclosed and claimed in a patent are developed, and these
are used to examine how technological impact varies accordingly.
A. Basis for Invalidation and Technological Impact
The basis on which a patent is invalidated provides a proxy for
identifying patents with greater or lesser information content, and such
identification in turn is useful for understanding the differences observed
above in cumulative innovation. A natural hierarchy emerges across the
statutory criteria with respect to information content. First, patents lacking
novelty,175 whereby all elements of the claimed invention were previously
disclosed in a single piece of prior art,176 by definition contribute no new
information to the public knowledge stock.177 Next, patents held obvious,
whereby all elements of the claimed invention are found in a combination of
related prior art references,178 may contribute some information but likely
have minimal productive value. Even though they combine elements from
multiple prior art sources,179 invalidity requires that the combination would
be obvious to skilled practitioners.180 Finally, patents invalidated for failure
of their written description,181 which otherwise satisfy the criteria of novelty
One consideration in whether to patent an invention is often “the ease with which the technology
could be reverse-engineered if marketed but not patented.” Scotchmer, supra note 33, at 39.
175 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
176 Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is
anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently
described, in a single prior art reference.”).
177 This assumes that any new information disclosed in a patent is likely to be covered by the scope
of its claims; this is a reasonable assumption given that patents are drafted by specialized attorneys who
are trained to maximize claim scope.
178 See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
179 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H.
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
180 By contrast, evidence of unexpected results from an otherwise obvious combination may preserve
the validity of a patent under § 103. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692–93 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
181 35 U.S.C. § 112.
174
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and nonobviousness, may be expected to have relatively high information
content by comparison. They do contribute some new technical information
to the public, albeit in a potentially less comprehensible or usable format
than valid patents.182
To exploit these statutory differences, each invalidity case in the dataset
is reviewed, and a flag is coded to indicate whether the reason was lack of
novelty,183 obviousness,184 failure of written description or enablement,185 or
other.186 Where a patent was invalidated for multiple reasons, each
corresponding flag is coded as true.187
Adding these flags to the regressions yields striking results. Consistent
with the theory above, there is a significant negative relationship between
lack of novelty and citations. Repeating these regressions using only thirdparty citations and only examiner-made citations as the dependent variable
yields the same observed effect.188 Additionally, as expected, patents
invalidated under § 112 exhibit a positive relationship with citations relative
to other invalid patents, although the relationship is weaker than for valid
patents. Appendix G provides the regression results, and the box plots in
Figure 4 illustrate the relationship, splitting the citation distribution
according to the basis for invalidation:

182 For example, a patent invalidated under § 112 may fail to enable others to practice the invention
without undue experimentation, In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), or it may simply lack
clarity in its description of the invention itself, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
183 35 U.S.C. § 102.
184 Id. § 103.
185 Id. § 112.
186 Lack of subject matter under § 101 is also coded, but it is not separately analyzed below.
187 There are a very small number of patents that were invalidated on multiple grounds. A review of
the cases reveals that parties often assert multiple statutory bases for invalidation, but courts often decline
to address other arguments once they have concluded that a patent is invalid on one of the bases.
188 The novelty flag is generally significant at the five- or ten-percent level; only in the model of
applicant citations is novelty not significant (but it is still signed negative). See generally Statistical
Significance, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significance [https://perma.cc/5KXKKXY2].
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FIGURE 4: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT BASIS FOR INVALIDATION

B. Information Content Analysis
The next analysis focuses on the information content of a patent
directly, using several variables found in previous studies as well as new
unique variables constructed here. The variables are:
Backward Citations (BC): This is the absolute number of prior patents cited by
the applicant or USPTO examiner during prosecution. Backward citations are
widely used in studies of knowledge flow and patent quality. 189
BC Span: This represents the timespan between the first and last backward
citation of a given patent. For simplicity, the patent numbers of the backward
citations are used as approximations of their issue dates, and the difference
between the largest and smallest is calculated; this difference is divided by the
total number of backward citations. 190 Accordingly, patents that draw upon a
wider range of technological history, relative to the absolute number of citations
made, will have a higher BC Span value.
BC Sigma: This represents the relative number of backward citations made by
a patent compared to other patents in its cohort. Specifically, the number of
backward citations made by each patent in the dataset is divided by the average
number of backward citations made by each other issued patent in the same
technology class and filing year cohort, and divided by the standard deviation
of the cohort distribution.

189 See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity:
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 453 (2004) (using backward citations
in a composite measure of patent quality).
190 Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (using age and other characteristics of prior art citations in a
model to predict patent validity).
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Originality: This represents the technological variety of the backward citations,
calculated using the formula described by Professors Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg.191
Claims: This is the number of independent claims. 192 This provides a measure
of the scope of exclusivity of a patent.193
Dependent-per-Independent Claims: In addition to the number of independent
claims, the number of dependent claims relative to independent claims is
calculated. This provides additional detail about the scope of exclusivity, as
dependent claims are often added to further specify broad independent
claims.194
Family Size: This is the number of other patents in the same patent family. 195
This variable also reflects the scope of exclusivity, as additional claims are often
filed in multiple related patents. It additionally represents private value to the
patent owner, as more related patents can reflect additional investment in
developing the technology.196
Inventors: This is the number of inventors named on each patent. The number
of inventors has been shown to be associated with patent value and quality. 197
Written Description (WD) Length: This variable extracts the written description
(excluding the abstract and claims) and counts the words. This represents the
patent’s literal knowledge transfer based on the quantity of information
provided in its written disclosure. The author is aware of no other study

191 See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 21 (calculating “originality” as the HHI of forward citations
based on their technology fields).
192 The models below alternatively substitute the number of total claims for the number of
independent claims and dependent-per-independent claims variables; the results are invariant to this
substitution.
193 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 189, at 443 (using number of claims in a composite measure
of patent quality); see also Alan C. Marco et al., Patent Claims and Patent Scope 11–12 (USPTO,
Economic
Working
Paper
No. 2016-04,
2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844964
[https://perma.cc/PKU3-WGR7] (describing number of independent claims as a measure of patent scope).
194 See Marco et al., supra note 193, at 11–12 (citing World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp.,
769 F.3d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that
distinct claims, particularly an independent claim and its dependent claim, have different scopes.”))
(describing claim scope and the principle of claim differentiation).
195 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 189, at 443, 447 (using family size of claims in a composite
measure of patent quality).
196 See, e.g., Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 110–11 (discussing family size and postissuance investment).
197 Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 465, 471 (using number of inventors in a model
of patent value).
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analyzing the length of a patent’s written description, although a few studies
have analyzed patent text to assess information content and scope.198
WD per Independent Claims: This variable uses the written description word
count divided by the independent claims to provide a measure of the amount of
disclosure relative to claim scope.199
Abstract Length: This variable extracts the written abstract of each patent and
counts the number of words.
Figures: Figures are often used as illustrations of inventions and therefore may
be relevant to literal knowledge transfer. Like WD Length, this also provides a
measure of literal disclosure, but the number of figures is expected to be less
useful because certain technologies are not representable by graphics and there
is no statutory requirement to include figures.
Length of Priority Claim: Certain patents derived their priority dates from
previously filed applications with respect to all or a portion of their
specifications.200 Given that priority claims represent disclosures that have
already been published and may be older than the current state of the art, priority
claims are expected to correspond with lower impact on future technology. The
duration between the filing date and the original publication date is therefore
recorded for each patent with a priority claim.

From these unique variables, the following analyzes the relationship
between information content variables and forward citations, constructs new
information content metrics, and analyzes the relationship between patent
validity and information content using these metrics.
1. Information Content Variables and Forward Citations
First, the information content variables described above are included in
the forward citations model to analyze the relative importance of each
factor.201 The coefficients are shown in Appendix H, and several specific
results are relevant to the present analysis. First, regarding the information
quantity variables, the word length of the written description is positive and

198 See Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (analyzing the extent of alignment between the written
description and claims of a patent to assess validity); Marco et al., supra note 193, at 12–13 (introducing
a new metric of claim scope, independent claim length (ICL), calculated as the word length of the shortest
independent claim).
199 Given collinearity with the WD Length measure, only one of these variables is included in the
regressions.
200 For example, continuation patents are permitted to add claims to previously filed specifications
without adding new subject matter, and continuation-in-part patents add some new subject matter and
additional claims. See USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.06(c) (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-0200.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C7-L7WZ].
201 Each of the count variables is log-transformed prior to analysis by taking the natural logarithm of
the variable in interest plus one.
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significant.202 This supports the hypothesis that both claim scope and
information disclosure are important to future technological impact.
Additionally, the number of inventors is positive and significant, which as
expected also reflects information quantity and quality, as more inventors
working on a given invention may bring more expertise and diverse views.
Regarding claim scope, the number of independent claims is significant
and positive, likely reflecting a possible relationship between exclusivity and
technological impact. This is also indicated by the positive significance of
patent family size, likely reflecting both broader claim scope and increased
investment by the patent owner in the underlying technology. 203 This is
analyzed further in Section IV.C below using the length of the shortest
independent claim as a measure of claim scope.204
The backward citation variables are also relevant to focus on for the
present study. The overall number of backward citations is less significant
than the BC Sigma variable, representing the relative number of citations
compared with other patents in the same cohort. Also, both the range of
backward citations (BC Span) and their originality are positive and
significant, indicating that range and diversity of backward citations are
measures of productive information disclosure.205 Finally, regarding age of
the disclosure, the length of the patent’s priority claim is negative and
significant, indicating that previously disclosed information is associated
with a weaker technology impact.
2. Information Content Metrics
To analyze the overall relationship between information content and
technological impact, two metrics are constructed that combine the
information content variables above. The first metric is a linear combination
formed by weighting the value of each variable by its corresponding
coefficient in the citations model. Using this combined metric in the citations
model yields a strongly significant positive relationship. Since the
coefficients are derived from the same model, this metric is interpreted as
representing the aggregate portion of variation in forward citations that is
attributable to the information content variables.
Next, the information variables are combined directly, without
weighting them with the model coefficients. To do so, each variable is
converted into a z-score, which is a centered and unitless measure of the
202 Changing to absolute length of written description does not affect results. Changing from
independent claims to total claims does not affect results.
203 See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 457.
204 See infra Section IV.C.
205 See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 118, at 21 (originality); Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (prior
art citations).
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number of standard deviations from the mean.206 Z-scores can be combined
directly without significant loss of data if they are positively correlated with
each other.207 After checking cross-correlations, the abstract length (which is
largely independent) is omitted and the negative value of the priority claim
duration (which is negatively correlated) is used.
The resulting combined metric is significantly correlated with the first
information content metric. Additionally, using this metric in the citations
model reveals a highly significant positive relationship, reflecting a strong
relationship between information content and forward citations.208
3. Validity and Information Content
Now, the combined metrics are used to investigate whether valid and
invalid patents exhibit differences in information content and whether the
different types of invalid patents vary accordingly. First, the original
information content metric is regressed on the validity flag and controls for
technology class, cohort, and patent age. The validity coefficient is positive
and significant at the five-percent level, indicating that valid patents have
greater information content, according to this measure, than invalid patents.
Next, the flags described above indicating the basis of invalidation
(novelty, obviousness, or failure of written description and enablement under
§ 112) are added to the regression. Although each of these flags has positive
coefficients in the resulting model, there is a hierarchy of significance among
them. Valid patents exhibit the strongest relationship with information
content. Obvious patents also exhibit a positive relationship, significant at
the ten-percent level. Patents invalidated under § 112 are significant at only
the thirty-percent level, but this may suggest a moderate positive relationship
given the smaller number of § 112 patents in the sample. Finally, patents
lacking novelty come last. They exhibit the weakest relationship with
information content, indicating that they have less citation-generating
information content than any other patents.209
The analysis above is repeated with the second information content
metric. There is a strong positive relationship between this metric and
forward citations. A similar hierarchy also exists when regressing the second
metric on the flags for the basis of invalidation. Valid patents exhibit the
strongest relationship, and patents invalidated for obviousness exhibit a
206

See, e.g., TOM TULLIS & BILL ALBERT, MEASURING THE USER EXPERIENCE: COLLECTING,
ANALYZING, AND PRESENTING USABILITY METRICS 198 (2008) (discussing how z-scores can serve as a
unitless measure of any continuous variable, thereby facilitating combination of variables that have
different natural scales).
207 See id.
208 See infra Appendix H.
209 See infra Appendix H.
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slightly weaker positive relationship. Also, the flag for patents lacking
novelty is not significant, which by comparison indicates lower information
content.210
Both metrics indicate that obvious patents have higher information
content than § 112 patents, whereas the analysis of forward citations relative
to basis for invalidation found the reverse. The difference in results makes
sense. With respect to the number of claims, length of written description,
and scope of backward citations, obvious patents are expected to score higher
given that, by definition, they represent a combination of multiple prior art
technologies. However, more information is not necessarily better
information. Because the content of obvious patents is older (and unoriginal),
it is not as productively useful in spurring future progress.
Finally, the relationship between information content and the likelihood
that a patent will be held valid is tested by constructing a probit model of
validity, which evaluates the probability of the regressors yielding a given
binary outcome (in this case, 1 for valid and 0 for invalid). Adding the second
information content metric, the unweighted combination of the information
content variables, again reveals a significant positive relationship between
validity and information content.211
C. Claim Scope and Technological Impact
The final analysis investigates how the scope of a patent’s claims relates
to information content. This uses new metrics recently pioneered by the
USPTO Office of the Chief Economist (OCE).212 In a large-scale study of all
patents issued since 1976, the OCE measured the relationship between the
number of independent claims (ICC) and the word length of the shortest
independent claim (ICL) with several measures of claim scope and patent
quality, including likelihood of issuance,213 patent maintenance,214 and earlystage forward citations.215 They found that the total number of independent
claims should be positively correlated with patent scope and private patent
value, whereas the length of the shortest independent claim, in which
210

See infra Appendix H.
See infra Appendix H.
212 Marco et al., supra note 193, at 12–13 (introducing a new metric of claim scope, ICL, calculated
as the word length of the shortest independent claim); see also Jeffrey M. Kuhn et al., Measuring Patent
Scope: What Works, What Doesn’t, and How to Use it for Causal Inference 10 (2017) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.neil-t.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Measuring_Patent_Scope.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW4N-Q3XJ] (discussing hypothesis that “adding words to claims generally narrows
them and subtracting words generally broadens them”).
213 Marco et al., supra note 193, at 14.
214 Id. at 21–22.
215 Id.
211
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additional words correspond to more limitations that must be satisfied to
prove infringement, should be negatively correlated.216 Their findings
regarding ICL are particularly striking, as no previous study had analyzed
claim scope in this way.217 Here, the correlation between ICL and patent
validity is tested. In turn, ICC and ICL are used to measure whether claim
scope is positively related to future technological impact as measured by
lifetime citations in the models.
First, the word length of the shortest independent claim of each patent
in the dataset is computed,218 and the ICL of valid and invalid patents is
compared. The valid patents have significantly greater ICL measures, or
significantly more words per shortest independent claim. This is consistent
with the OCE’s findings that ICL tends to increase as limitations are added
during prosecution to overcome prior art rejections.219 That is, patents that
issued with shorter independent claims may have undergone less scrutiny
during prosecution and otherwise are more likely to be susceptible to
challenges that prior art patents anticipate or obviate their more extensive
claim breadth.220
Next, ICL measures are compared across the bases of invalidation by
regressing ICL on controls and various validity flags. Patents lacking novelty
have significantly shorter ICL than other patents, all else equal. This
suggests that patents that did not undergo as much restriction of their claim
scope during prosecution are more vulnerable to invalidation for lack of
novelty.
Finally, ICL is added into the model of forward citations. As shown in
Appendix I, initially no significant relationship is found between ICL and
citations. However, the true relationship may be obscured by the relationship
between validity and ICL. Splitting the data using two interaction variables,
one indicating the ICL measure for valid patents and another indicating the
ICL measure for invalid patents, yields results. The ICL-Valid interaction is
negatively significant, which indicates that shorter—that is, broader—
claims in valid patents give rise to greater technological impact.221 In
216

Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 6 (“[T]here has been precious little empirical analysis of initial application claiming
practices and changes to claims during the examination process.”).
218 These regressions use the natural logarithm of the word count, consistent with the approach to
other explanatory variables.
219 Id. at 14 (“[T]he prosecution and examination process on average narrows the scope of
applications by increasing ICL from 106 words at publication to 156 words at grant . . . .”).
220 See id. (“[A]pplications that go abandoned have a larger mass of shorter claims for PGPubs. This
confirms that allowances are less frequent for applications that have claims of greater scope.”).
221 This is consistent with the OCE’s predictions that patents with greater novelty should be able to
secure more claim scope and have greater impact on subsequent technologies. Id. at 23 (“First-movers in
217
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addition, the independent claim count variable is also positively significant
in this model. Taken together, this shows that, for valid patents, broader
claims are associated with a greater impact on subsequent technology.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that the disclosure function of patents
promotes technological progress notwithstanding their private rights of
exclusivity. According to the foundational “tradeoff” of patent theory,
patents encourage disclosure of new and useful technical information for
public benefit, but they do so by restricting public use of that information
during their exclusive terms. Patented information remains available for
productive public use in developing new inventions, notwithstanding the
private rights of exclusivity. Moreover, private exclusivity and public benefit
are both related to the information disclosure function of patents. The more
technical information a patent discloses, the more likely it is to secure valid
exclusive rights to its owner and the more progress it is likely to spur through
future technological developments by others. Finally, by analyzing the
breadth of claims that are validly supported by sufficient information
disclosures, valid patents with broader exclusivity are found to have a
greater positive impact on future technologies.
The principal findings of this study are summarized as follows. First,
valid patents promote more technological progress than invalid patents. This
holds true for future inventions by third parties and follow-on developments
by the patent owners. It is generally observable across technology classes.
Second, among invalid patents, the basis on which they are invalidated
corresponds to varying impacts on future technology. Patents invalidated for
failure to disclose new technical information tend to have the weakest
impact.
Third, the information content–technological impact relationship is
measurable directly using the intrinsic characteristics of a patent’s
disclosure. Information content variables, and metrics based on them,
correlate strongly with subsequent citations.
Fourth, valid patents tend to have greater information content than
invalid patents, as measured by these variables and metrics. In turn, the
differences observed between the respective types of invalid patents map
onto variations in information content. As expected, patents invalidated for
lack of novelty have the least information content.

a technology space have the opportunity to patent fundamental inventions. These seminal patents can be
expected to have broader scope than the incremental inventions that follow.” (internal citation omitted)).
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Finally, the private exclusivity granted by a patent’s claims does not
effectively impede the technological impact of its information disclosure. By
contrast, the claim breadth of valid patents correlates with greater impact on
future technologies.
Most significantly, as a general rule, the exclusivity and disclosure
functions of patents work hand in hand. Where disclosure is working
properly, as the criteria for patent validity require, the information so
disclosed is available for productive use by other inventors. However, this
also focuses attention on possible breakdowns of disclosure. If the proportion
of patents lacking novelty is too high, the disclosure benefits of patents may
be thwarted.
These results also motivate several avenues for future research and
policy focus. In particular, the nexus between information content and patent
quality is an important area of inquiry. Future work will attempt to analyze
the information content of patents more directly using natural language
processing and other modern techniques that advance beyond rudimentary
word counts.
In summary, this study finds a positive relationship between patent
validity, cumulative innovation, and information disclosure. These findings
speak to tradeoff theory at the heart of patent discourse, suggesting that the
public disclosure and private exclusivity functions of patents are not only in
tension with each other. Rather, this study observes evidence of reciprocity
between the two, whereby patents that disclose more and newer information
are more likely to be valid, have broader claims, and give rise to more
subsequent inventions. Accordingly, this study lends additional
understanding and empirical data to the dynamic relationship between patent
disclosure and exclusivity.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF DATASET
A. Patents
TABLE A.1: COUNTS
NValid

416

NInvalid

502

TABLE A.2: TECHNOLOGY CLASSES
Chemical

Valid
Invalid
Total

Computers
&
Comm.
37 (49.3%) 117 (37.5%)

Electrical Mechanical

Others

97 (47.1%) 42 (64.6%) 38 (44.2%)

38 (50.7%) 195 (62.5%)

109 (52.9%) 23 (35.4%) 48 (55.8%)

85
(48.9%)
89
(51.1%)
174

75

312

Drugs &
Medical

206

65

86

B. Age and Date Ranges

TABLE A.3: FILING YEAR–VALID PATENTS
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1979 1993
1997 1996 1999 2005

TABLE A.4: FILING YEAR–INVALID PATENTS
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1975 1995
1998 1997 2000 2005

TABLE A.5: ISSUE YEAR–VALID PATENTS
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1982 1995
1999 1998 2002 2006

TABLE A.6: ISSUE YEAR–INVALID PATENTS
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1977 1998
2000 2000 2003 2006
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C. Distribution of Citations
FIGURE A.1: FORWARD CITATIONS BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION MODEL CONSTRUCTION

TABLE B.1
Model 1
0.3064
0.2681
7.998
F
(48,
(k-1, N-k)
869)
Validity p-val. 2.48e-05
R2
Adj. R2

Regressors

Base(a)

Model 2
0.3451
0.3082

Model 3
0.3531
0.3150

Model 4
0.7020
0.6841

Model 5
0.6077
0.5841

9.336
(49, 868)

9.268
(51866, 863)

39.19
(52, 865)

25.77
(52, 865)

1.08e-05
(1)
+ Generality

5.94e-06
(2)
+ Acquired(b)

1.47-03
6.47e-04
(3)
(3)
+ Quality(c) + ln(EarlyFC)

(a)

Base = HJT32 + ln(Age) + FileYr (decile) + ln(Ind.Clms.) + ln(BC) + Originality
Acquired = Assigned? (Bool) + Lien? (Bool)
(c)
Quality is calculated using the methodology proposed by Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2004). However, because it includes a weighted measure of lifetime
forward citations it artificially boosts the model, and it is removed from the final version
for analysis.
(b)
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APPENDIX C: INITIAL RESULTS AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

TABLE C.1: FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG)
Estimate
4.8
0.5
0.1

Std. Err.
2.6
0.1
0.6

t-value
1.9
5.3
0.3

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0.00E+00
0.8

Sig.
.
***

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.6
-2.3

0.3
0.3

-2
-8.4

0
0

*
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.6
3.9
2.3

0
0
0

*
***
*

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

21.1

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.8381 on 859 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6254.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6002.
F-statistic: 24.73 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE C.2: EXAMINER CITATIONS (LOG)
Estimate
7
0.5
-0.5

Std. Err.
2.3
0.1
0.5

t-value
3.1
5.7
-1

Pr(>|t|)
0
0
0.3

Sig.
**
***

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.8
-2.4

0.3
0.2

-3.1
-9.9

0
0

**
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.5
1.5
2.1

0
0.1
0

*

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

23.6

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.7442 on 859 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6398.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6155.
F-statistic: 26.31 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE C.3: APPLICANT CITATIONS (LOG)
Estimate
0
0.5
1.5

Std. Err.
3.1
0.1
0.7

t-value
0
4.8
2.1

Pr(>|t|)
1
0
0

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.3
-2.2

0.3
0.3

-0.8
-6.6

0.4
0

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.2
0.2

0.1
0
0.1

2.3
5.9
1.6

0
0
0.1

*
***

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

17.2

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Sig.
***
*

***

Residual standard error: 1.005 on 859 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5855.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5576.
F-statistic: 20.92 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE C.4: THIRD PARTY CITATIONS (LOG)
(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Estimate
5.7
0.5
0.2

Std. Err.
2.7
0.1
0.6

t-value
2.2
4.7
0.4

Pr(>|t|)
0
0
0.7

Sig.
*
***

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.7
-2.5

0.3
0.3

-2.3
-8.8

0
0

*
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.1
3.3
1.8

0
0
0.1

*
***
.

lnEarlyFC

0.7

0

20.9

0

***

Residual standard error: 0.8705 on 859 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6233.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5978.
F-statistic: 24.5 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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APPENDIX D: ENDOGENEITY TESTS
TABLE D.1: REGRESSING LOG OF EARLY YEARS OF CITATIONS
R2
Adj. R2
F
(k-1, N-k)
Validity p-val.

First 2 Years
0.3486
0.3431
9.258
(58, 859)
0.018 *

First 3 Years
0.408
0.368
10.21
(58, 859)
0.0104 *

First 5 Years
0.4136
0.374
10.44
(58, 859)
0.00754 **

TABLE D.2: EXCLUDING PATENTS BASED ON EARLY CITATIONS PERCENTILE
Excl. 40%
0.5266
0.4603

Excl. 50%
0.5514
0.4713

F
9.074
9.099
8.447
7.941
(k-1, N-k)
(65, 754)
(65, 656)
(65, 563)
(65, 464)
Validity p-val. 1.75e-04 *** 1.99e-03 ** 3.87e-03 ** 2.11e-03 **
N
820
722
629
530

6.883
(65, 364)
4.23e-03 **
430

R2
Adj. R2

Excl. 10%
0.4389
0.3905

Excl. 20%
0.4741
0.422

Excl. 30%
0.4937
0.4353

TABLE D.3: EXCLUDING APPEALS
R2
Adj. R2
F
(k-1, N-k)
Validity p-val.
N

Excl. Appeals
0.66
0.6203
16.61
(74, 633)
0.02724 *
708

Excl. PH Appeals
0.6454
0.6102
18.35
(74, 746)
0.00251 **
821

Excl. AI Appeals
0.64
0.6036
17.54
(74, 730)
0.0120 *
805

A. Rivers–Vuong Analysis
1.

Prior Art Metric

A metric is constructed representing the extent of relevant prior art cited
by each patent, which will serve as instrument for validity. The value of the
metric for each baseline patent is computed by counting the number of
backward citations made by each patent that (i) is filed within two years (plus
or minus) of the baseline patent’s application year, (ii) is within the same
technology subclass, and (iii) cites any prior art patent that is cited by the
baseline patent. The mean and standard deviation of this set of backward
citation counts is calculated, and the metric is recorded as the baseline
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patent’s number of standard deviations from this mean. Statistics for this
metric are provided below.
TABLE D.5: SUMMARY OF PRIORARTSIG1
Min.
-6.3950

1st Qu.
-0.9083

Median
-0.7500

Mean
-0.3434

3rd Qu.
-0.4536

Max.
25.6800

FIGURE D.1
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2.

Prior Art Metric as an Instrument for Validity

Adding the prior art metric described above into a probit model for
validity indicates a strong negative relationship between the metric and
validity, after controlling for technology class, age, patent characteristics and
other relevant factors.
TABLE D.6: VALIDITY PROBIT
(Intercept)
PriorArtsig1
HJT3212
lnAge
lnBC
lnDepPerIndCl

Estimate
13.1
0.1
-2.4

Std. Err.
5.4
0
1.1

t-value
2.4
2.8
-2.2

Pr(>|t|)
0
0
0

Sig.
*
**
*

-1.2
-0.1

0.6
0.1

-2.1
-1.3

0
0.2

*

0

0.1

0.5

0.6

Null deviance: 1264.5 on 917 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 1124.1 on 851 degrees of freedom
AIC: 1258.1
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3.

Test for Endogeneity

Adding the residuals of the validity probit into the full FC regression
reveals no significance:
TABLE D.7: LOG (FC) REGRESSION, ADDING PROBIT RESIDUALS
(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
PBRegr_Validity_resid
HJT3212
...
lnAge
lnDepPerIndCl

Estimate
7.1
0.2
0
1.1

Std. Err.
3.8
0.6
0.3
0.7

t-value
1.9
0.3
0
1.6

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0.8
1
0.1

Sig.
.

-0.8

0.4

-2

0

*

0.1

0

1.6

0.1

.

Residual standard error: 0.8268 on 850 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6393.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6109.
F-statistic: 22.49 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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APPENDIX E: SELECTION BIAS TESTS

TABLE E.1: ADDING TRUNCATION FLAG (RETAINING AGE AND FILING YEAR)
Estimate
5.5
0.5
0.1

Std. Err.
3.1
0.1
0.6

t-value
1.8
5.3
0.3

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0
0.8

Sig.
.
***

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.7
-2.3

0.4
0.3

-1.9
-8.4

0.1
0

.
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.5
3.9
2.3

0
0
0

*
***
*

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

21.1

0

***

Trunc_BTRUE

-0.1

0.1

-0.4

0.7

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.8385 on 858 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6255.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5998.
F-statistic: 24.29 on 59 and 858 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE E.2: ADDING TRUNCATION FLAG (EXCLUDING AGE AND FILING YEAR)
Estimate
-0.2
0.7
0.1

Std. Err.
0.5
0.1
0.6

t-value
-0.3
6.9
0.2

Pr(>|t|)
0.8
0
0.8

Sig.

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.3
2.4
1.7

0
0
0.1

*
*
.

lnEarlyFC

0.5

0

17.2

0

***

Trunc_BTRUE

-0.7

0.1

-9.6

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

***

Residual standard error: 0.9081 on 868 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5556.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5305.
F-statistic: 22.15 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE E.3: EXCLUDING TRUNCATED PATENTS
Estimate
7.1
0.5
-2.5

Std. Err.
4.2
0.1
1

t-value
1.7
4.1
-2.5

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0
0

Sig.
.
***
*

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.8
-1.4

0.5
0.6

-1.8
-2.5

0.1
0

.
*

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.2
0.1
0.4

0.1
0
0.1

3
2
3

0
0
0

**
*
**

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

15.6

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.8774 on 611 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5923.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5542.
F-statistic: 15.57 on 57 and 611 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
N: 669.

TABLE E.4: FIRST TEN YEARS OF CITATIONS
Estimate
8.1
0.1
1.1

Std. Err.
3.2
0.1
0.6

t-value
2.6
2.5
1.9

Pr(>|t|)
0
0
0.1

Sig.
*
*
.

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.9
-1.5

0.4
0.3

-2.7
-5.6

0
0

**
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.1

0.1
0
0.1

1.2
2
1.3

0.2
0
0.2

*

lnEarlyFC

0.7

0

25

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.7828 on 850 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6636.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6371.
F-statistic: 25.03 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE E.5: EXCLUDING HIGHEST (AND LOWEST) CITED PATENTS
5%
0.5938
0.5599

R2
Adj. R2

Excluding Top
10%
20%
0.5726
0.527
0.5348
0.4793

50%
0.4837
0.3952

F
17.52
15.14
11.04
5.47
(k-1, N-k)
(67, 803)
(67, 757)
(67, 664)
(67, 391)
Validity p-val. 1.12e-04*** 5.08e-05*** 6.48e-04*** 8.53e-03**
N
871
825
732
459

Only Top
50%
0.4421
0.3564
5.158
(67, 397)
2.54e-06***
459

TABLE E.6: COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTES OF VALID VS. INVALID PATENTS

Total Claims
Indep. Claims
WD length
Abstr. length
# Inventors
Bk. Citations
Originality

Valid
Mean
Median
24.42
18
3.868
3
7683
5620
124
121
2.548
2
29.45
17
0.4763
0.5380

Invalid
Mean
Median
29.82
22
4.833
2
8694
5481
121
121
2.703
2
38.21
18
0.4851
0.5333

Sig.
p-val*
0.7588
0.2424 (-)
0.3465
0.1676
0.9374
0.4075
0.5598

*
p-values obtained by regressing attribute in question on HJT32, log(Age)
and ValidB flag; significance of ValidB flag reported. Log-linear regression used
for skewed attributes; quasi glm regression used for other non-normal attributes.

TABLE E.7: FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS—FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG) (INCLUDING
OVERLAPPING BASE PATENTS)
(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Estimate
9.2
0.2
-0.3

Std. Err.
3.1
0.1
0.8

t-value
3
2.7
-0.4

Pr(>|t|)
0
0
0.7

Sig.
**
**

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-1.2
-1.8

0.3
0.3

-4
-6.2

0
0

***
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.5
1.7
1.8

0
0.1
0.1

*
.
.

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

15.1

0

***

Residual standard error: 0.9133 on 773 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5089.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4702.
F-statistic: 13.13 on 61 and 773 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE E.8: FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS—FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG) (EXCLUDING
OVERLAPPING BASE PATENTS)
Estimate
-0.2
0.2
-0.3

Std. Err.
6.1
0.1
0.8

t-value
0
2.2
-0.4

Pr(>|t|)
1
0
0.7

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.3
-0.3

0.6
0.6

-0.5
-0.5

0.6
0.6

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0
0
0.1

0.1
0
0.1

0.6
0.7
0.9

0.5
0.5
0.4

lnEarlyFC

0.6

0

12.2

0

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212

Sig.
*

***

Residual standard error: 0.8737 on 564 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.4833.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4283.
F-statistic: 8.791 on 60 and 564 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE E.9: COMBINED DISTRICT COURT AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS
Estimate
3.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.3

Std. Err.
2.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5

t-value
1.3
2.9
1.5
-0.1
-0.6

Pr(>|t|)
0.2
0
0.1
0.9
0.6

Sig.

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

-0.6
-1.7

0.2
0.2

-2.4
-7.6

0
0

*
***

lnIndClms
lnBC
origvals

0.1
0.1
0.2

0
0
0.1

2.8
4.6
3.3

0
0
0

**
***
***

lnEarlyFC

0.7

0

25.8

0

***

(Intercept)
ValidxNonApp
ValidxApp
InvalidxApp
HJT3212

Residual standard error: 0.8849 on 1479 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5587.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5399.
F-statistic: 29.72 on 63 and 1479 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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APPENDIX F: CLASS-SPECIFIC REGRESSIONS
TABLE F.1: RESTRICTING DATA TO EACH TECHNOLOGY CLASS
Computers
Drugs
Electrical Mechanical
& Comm. & Medical
0.7115
0.4481
0.4985
0.6896
0.8426
0.5036
0.3892
0.4159
0.3595
0.5959
3.421
7.606
6.032
2.087
25.58
(31, 43) (30, 281)
(29, 176)
(33, 31)
(31, 54)

Chemical
R2
Adj. R2
F
(k-1, N-k)
Validity
p-val.
N
(V:I)

Others
0.5321
0.4176
4.649
(34, 139)

0.066 .

0.0342 *

0.00271 **

0.263

7.41e-08

0.304

75
(37:38)

312
(117:195)

206
(97:109)

65
(42:23)

86
(38:48)

174
(85:89)

TABLE F.2: INCLUDING VALIDITY–TECHNOLOGY CLASS INTERACTION VARIABLES
(Intercept)
ValidBxHJT1
ValidBxHJT2
ValidBxHJT3
ValidBxHJT4
ValidBxHJT5
ValidBxHJT6

Estimate
-9.6
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.2
-0.0
0.2

Std. Err.
3.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2

t-value
-3.0
1.5
2.5
3.3
0.9
-0.1
1.4

Pr(>|t|)
0.00
0.12
0.01
0.00
0.38
0.91
0.15

Sig.
**
*
**

Residual standard error: 1.025 on 850 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.4456.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4019.
F-statistic: 10.2 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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APPENDIX G: BASIS OF INVALIDITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT
TABLE G.1: BASIS OF INVALIDITY REGRESSIONS
R2
Adj. R2
F
(k-1, N-k)
Validity p-val.
s102 p-val.
S103 p-val.
s112 p-val.

1002

log (FC)
0.5404
0.5286
45.71
(23, 894)
0.019 *
0.071 . (-)
0.678
0.044 *

log (3P FC)
0.5309
0.5188
43.99
(23, 894)
0.089 .
0.014 * (-)
0.817
0.045 *

log (Ex. FC)
0.5496
0.538
47.43
(23, 894)
0.113
0.002 ** (-)
0.721 (-)
0.116

log (Appl. FC)
0.4946
0.4816
38.04
(23, 894)
0.005 **
0.662 (-)
0.153
0.025 *
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APPENDIX H: INFORMATION CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT
TABLE H.1: SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION CONTENT VARIABLES IN FORWARD
CITATIONS MODEL
Variable
Bk. Citations

Coeff.
0.1

p-value
0.06

Sig.
.

BC Span

0.1

0

**

BC Sig.

0.1

0.04

*

Originality

0.1

0.02

*

Indep. Claims

0.2

0

***

0

0.23

Family Size

0.1

0.02

*

# Inventors

0.1

0.05

*

WD Length per Ind. Claim

0.1

0.01

**

Abstract Len.

0

0.61

# Figures

0

0.69

-0.1

0.03

Dep. per Indep. Claims

Length of Priority Claim

*

TABLE H.2: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #1 ON VALIDITY FLAG
(Intercept)
HJT3212
lnAge
ValidBTRUE

Estimate
2.7
-0.3

Std. Err.
1.1
0.3

t-value
2.4
-1.2

Pr(>|t|)
0.0
0.2

Sig.
*

-0.3
0.1

0.1
0.0

-2.6
2.1

0.0
0.0

**
*

Residual standard error: 0.3821 on 871 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.1222.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.07582.
F-statistic: 2.635 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: 5.148e-08.
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TABLE H.3: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #1 ON VALIDITY
AND INVALIDITY BASIS FLAGS
(Intercept)
HJT3212
lnAge
ValidBTRUE
s102_BTRUE
s103_BTRUE
s112_BTRUE

Estimate
2.6
-0.3

Std. Err.
1.1
0.3

t-value
2.4
-1.1

Pr(>|t|)
0.0
0.3

Sig.
*

-0.3
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1

0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1

-2.5
2.7
1.0
1.8
1.1

0.0
0.01
0.33
0.07
0.29

*
**
.

Residual standard error: 0.3819 on 868 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.126.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.0767.
F-statistic: 2.555 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: 6.782e-08.

A. Repeating Analysis with Info Content Metric #2
TABLE H.4: CORRELATION BETWEEN INFO CONTENT METRICS #1 AND #2
Cor.
0.914

p-val
<2.2e-16

TABLE H.5: REGRESSING FC ON INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 (PLUS CONTROLS)
(Intercept)
InfoContVar

Estimate
-10

Std. Err.
3.1

t-value
-3.4

Pr(>|t|)
0.0

Sig.
***

0.1

0.0

14

0.0

***

Residual standard error: 1.075 on 871 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.3753.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.3424.
F-statistic: 11.38 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE H.6: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 ON VALIDITY FLAG
(Intercept)
HJT3212
lnAge
ValidBTRUE

Estimate
38
-2.1

Std. Err.
12
2.9

t-value
3.1
-0.7

Pr(>|t|)
0.0
0.5

Sig.
**

-4.7
0.7

1.4
0.3

-3.3
2.4

0.0
0.02

***
*

Residual standard error: 4.317 on 871 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.1799.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.1366.
F-statistic: 4.155 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE H.7: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 ON VALIDITY
AND INVALIDITY BASIS FLAGS
(Intercept)
HJT3212
lnAge
ValidBTRUE
s102_BTRUE
s103_BTRUE
s112_BTRUE

Estimate
37
-1.9

Std. Err.
12
2.9

t-value
3.0
-0.6

Pr(>|t|)
0.0
0.5

Sig.
**

-4.7
1.2
0.5
0.8
0.6

1.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.6

-3.3
2.9
1.1
1.6
1.1

0.0
0.00
0.26
0.10
0.29

***
**
.

Residual standard error: 4.316 on 868 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.1831.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.137.
F-statistic: 3.97 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

TABLE H.8: PROBIT MODEL OF VALIDITY
(Intercept)
HJT3212

Estimate
-7.7
0.9

Std. Err.
4
0.9

t-value
-1.9
1

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0.3

Sig.
.

lnAge
FYr_dec.L

0.8
-0.6

0.5
0.5

1.7
-1.3

0.1
0.2

.

lnEarlyFC

0.1

0

1.8

0.1

.

InfoContVar

0.1

0

4.2

0

***
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APPENDIX I: CLAIM BREADTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT
A. Relationship Between ICL and Validity
TABLE I.1
Avg. ICL of Valid Patents

128.5 words

Avg. ICL of Invalid Patents

111.1 words

t-test of log(ICL)

p-val = 0.001048

TABLE I.2: REGRESSING ICL ON BASIS OF INVALIDATION
(Intercept)
HJT3212
lnAge
ValidBTRUE
s102_BTRUE
s103_BTRUE
s112_BTRUE

Estimate
1.1
0.4

Std. Err.
2
0.5

t-value
0.6
0.8

Pr(>|t|)
0.6
0.4

0.3
0.1
-0.1
0
-0.1

0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

1.5
1.2
-2.1
-0.6
-0.6

0.1
0.2
0
0.5
0.6

Sig.

*

Residual standard error: 0.6533 on 847 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2131
Adjusted R-squared: 0.1667
F-statistic: 4.588 on 50 and 847 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

B. Relationship Between ICL and Forward Citations
TABLE I.3: SINGLE ICL MEASURE
(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212
...
lnAge
FYr_dec.L
...
ICC
ICL

Estimate
4.5
0.2
-0.2

Std. Err.
2.7
0.1
0.6

t-value
1.6
3
-0.3

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0
0.8

-0.5
-2.5

0.3
0.3

-1.5
-8.7

0.1
0

0.2
-0.1

0.1
0

4
-1.1

0
0.3

Residual standard error: 0.8589 on 840 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6087.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5821.
F-statistic: 22.92 on 57 and 840 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
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TABLE I.4: ICL–VALIDITY INTERACTIONS

(Intercept)
ValidBTRUE
HJT3212
...
lnAge
FYr_dec.L
...
ICC
ICLxValid
ICLxInvalid

Estimate
4.3
0.9
-0.2

Std. Err.
2.7
0.4
0.6

t-value
1.6
2.4
-0.4

Pr(>|t|)
0.1
0
0.7

-0.5
-2.5

0.3
0.3

-1.6
-8.8

0.1
0

0.2
-0.1
0

0.1
0.1
0.1

4
-2.2
0.3

0
0
0.8

Sig.
*

***
***
*

Residual standard error: 0.8574 on 839 degrees of freedom.
Multiple R-squared: 0.6105.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5836.
F-statistic: 22.67 on 58 and 839 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

1007

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1008

